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1. Executive Summary 
 
Infosys IT security Maturity Model (INFOSeMM) has been developed with the objective 
of assessing an organization’s level of preparedness in handling cyber threats.  We use 
the phrase IT security to also mean Information Security. 
 
Infosys is currently perceived as an information technology service provider.  The ISM 
model can move Infosys up the value chain by opening up a significantly increased 
revenue stream to the higher margin IT security consulting and let such consulting 
assignments lead to new IT security assessment, design and development business 
opportunities.  This can be grown to be an independent business unit within Infosys. 
 
ISM is defined to be a four level model which categorizes an organization into inactive, 
reactive, streamlined and proactive with respect to its current status based on a study of 
the IT security gap analysis.   
 
Each organization can be assigned a three letter IT security Maturity index that starts with 
the poorest rating of DDD to the most desirable rating of AAA.  
 
The ratings have two purposes.   
 
The first purpose is for the Chief Security Officer (CSO) of a company to assess and 
report the company’s IT security maturity level to its top management.  The CSO could 
then use the index to discuss with the company’s top management the maturity level and 
as a result the index at which the company should be positioned.  This helps the CSO to 
obtain IT investments commensurate with the desired positioning of the company as 
decided by its top management. 
 
The second purpose is for a company to use this index as a competitive advantage in 
getting outsourced projects.  The company’s with a better index can both assure the 
outsourcer about their quality of service with respect to information security preparedness 
and as a result seek a premium for its services in comparison with its competitors. 
 
The framework developed allows Infosys engage in three main type of assessment and 
resulting mitigation related projects.  The three main categories are IT Security Maturity 
assessment, Regulation compliance and Vulnerability and threat assessment and 
mitigation. The Vulnerability and threat assessment and mitigation can be further 
subdivided into twenty four small scale assignments in order to provide for those 
customers who would like to take small steps towards reaching their desired IT security 
maturity. 
 
Details of the IT security maturity model and the ensuing business opportunities for 
Infosys can be found in the following pages of the report. 
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2. The Business Problem 
 
Businesses are faced with a continuing battle related to cyber security related issues 
ranging from cyber attacks all the way to cyber (information) war.  These issues affect 
result in information, system, reputation, and revenue related risks.  These risks arise 
because of vulnerabilities introduced in three major parts of the enterprise – 
infrastructure, intelligence and practices.  Infrastructure includes network, systems and 
environment.  Intelligence includes applications and data.  Practice includes people, 
processes and management.   
 
External threats constantly hope to exploit the vulnerabilities offered by an enterprise.  
The industry vertical or domain that a company operates in determined the extent to 
which it is exposed to risks as a result of the combination of vulnerabilities and threats.  
The risks lead to loss of current and future business (revenues), regulatory wrath, waste 
of precious management resources, and business costs.  These are collectively termed 
Impact on business.  A company has to respond to and manage the impact on its business 
due to the risks. 
 
The following diagram captures the relationship between vulnerabilities, threats, risks, 
business impact and business response / action.   
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between threats, vulnerabilities, verticals, risks and impact 
on business. 
 
Every business’ executive team has no problem relating and responding to credit and 
other ratings issued by the likes of S&P and Moody’s Morningstar stock grades.  These 
ratings reflect the state of a business’ health and hence the investment value of their 
companies as perceived by analysts.  Executive teams in businesses do not have a means 
of identifying how well prepared their enterprise is, in the forecasting, identifying and 
Threats Vulnerabilities 
Impact on Business 
Response 
Vertical / Domain 
Risks 
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managing cyber security related issues1.  Executive teams will greatly benefit by knowing 
the state of their cyber security health.   Once they know the state of cyber security health 
                                                 
1
 Security ROI calculations pose challenges for users – November 2001 
Business-oriented approach recommended, but meaningful measurements can be elusive  
By JAIKUMAR VIJAYAN 
Waltham, Mass.  
Information technology managers who are looking to justify their security spending would be better off 
presenting the issue as a fundamental business problem instead of as a technical one, according to security 
analysts who spoke at a seminar here last month. The business-oriented approach offers a way to 
demonstrate achievable returns on security investments and lets companies plan their security spending 
more strategically, the analysts said.  
But the problem, according to users, is that there aren't many obvious ways to measure the ROI of security 
efforts. "We have talked about how we're going to measure ROI with the finance people, and we haven't 
come up with any good measures yet," said Matt Kesner, chief technology officer at Fenwick & West LLP, 
a law firm in Palo Alto, Calif.  
Fenwick & West learned the value of tightening IT security firsthand after its Web site was taken down by 
a virus earlier this year. The firm plans to increase its security spending by 100% next year and has also 
budgeted for regular audits of its security capabilities, Kesner said. "There's a realization for the first time 
that security has a direct bearing on the business," he added.  
In most cases, security spending usually rises only after major incidents, according to a survey released in 
March by IDC in Framingham, Mass. The toughest part about justifying investments is trying to assign a 
dollar value to the level of security needed to keep a company safe, said an IT manager at a major New 
York-based financial services firm who asked not to be named.  
Pulling Numbers From Thin Air 
 
"The major problem right now is that we don't have a good feel for what the real risks are and the costs 
[that are] associated with these risks—so that any numbers we plug into [ROI] models would be pulled 
from thin air," he said. One way around that problem is to stop viewing IT security as something that 
simply involves plugging holes, installing firewalls and reacting to the latest viruses, said Chris Wysopal, 
an analyst at Cambridge, Mass.-based @Stake Inc., which organized the seminar along with Bedford, 
Mass.-based RSA Security Inc.  
Instead, Wysopal said, security should be presented as a central business issue that needs to be addressed at 
the start of IT projects. Potential cost savings from that approach can be used to demonstrate ROI, Wysopal 
added. For example, @Stake's research shows that companies that focus on security issues during the 
project design stage typically spend 60 to 100 times less than businesses that try to fix problems during 
later implementation phases or after a system has gone into use.  
Sean Nolan, CIO at online retailer Drugstore.com Inc. in Bellevue, Wash., said security-related investments 
should be looked at more as a cost of doing business than in terms of the ROI they can generate. But no 
matter how security is viewed, "I think it's clear that focusing [on it] early is going to be far cheaper than 
the alternative," Nolan said. Putting that idea into practice, Drugstore.com has developed reusable 
procedures and code libraries for building security features into its systems right at the design stage, he 
said. 
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of their company, they can then decide the desired state of health and generate a plan of 
getting there.   
 
All attempts have so far focused on technical aspects of information security and have not 
linked the vulnerabilities to exposure to risk and the resulting impact on business 
performance.  We have developed an IT security maturity model and a corresponding 
index.  The index can be used as a means of empowering business executives to make 
informed decisions on managing the business impacts of cyber security generated risks of 
their companies at a desired level. 
 
Potential benefit to Infosys 
 
The proposed maturity model can be used to position Infosys as a leader in the 
information security consulting business.  Such consulting projects can lead to follow-on 
IT services projects because of the client’s trust in Infosys to be Information Security 
sensitive in delivering their solutions.  This applies to Infosys subsidiaries such as 
Progeon. 
 
The maturity model can also be used as an investment by Infosys in building and 
maintaining customer relationships.  For example, this will be a valuable tool for the 
Chief Security Officers or Chief Information Officers of businesses to justify their 
requests for investments into IT security solutions for a desired maturity level.  The CSOs 
and CIOs are likely to be satisfied customers of Infosys.
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3. The Challenge 
 
There have been several information security related models. Three of the more 
prominent ones are the SSE-CMM2 and OCTAVE3 by Carnegie Mellon’s Software 
Engineering Institute and CDSA4 by the Open Group.  For those dealing with US 
                                                 
2
 The Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model 
(SSE-CMM)  
The SSE-CMM describes the essential characteristics of an organization's security engineering process that must exist 
to ensure good security engineering. The model is intended to be used as a:  
• Tool for engineering organizations to evaluate security engineering practices and define improvements to 
them.  
• Standard mechanism for customers to evaluate a provider's security engineering capability.  
• Basis for security engineering evaluation organization (e.g., system certifiers and product evaluators) to 
establish organization capability-based confidences (as an ingredient to system or project security assurance).  
The SSE-CMM addresses security engineering activities that span the entire trusted product or secure system life cycle, 
including concept definition, requirements analysis, design, development, integration, installation, operations, 
maintenance, and decommissioning.  
The SSE-CMM applies secure product developers, secure system developers and integrators, and organizations that 
provide security services and security engineering. The SSE-CMM applies to all types and sizes of security engineering 
organizations, such a commercial, government, and academic.  
--------------------- 
3
 The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationSM (OCTAVESM) is a framework for 
identifying and managing information security risks. It defines a comprehensive evaluation method that allows an 
organization to identify the information assets that are important to the mission of the organization, the threats to those 
assets, and the vulnerabilities that may expose those assets to the threats. By putting together the information assets, 
threats, and vulnerabilities, the organization can begin to understand what information is at risk. With this 
understanding, the organization can design and implement a protection strategy to reduce the overall risk exposure of 
its information assets.  A description about OCTAVE from SEI website is attached later. 
 
-------------------- 
 
4
 The Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA) is a set of layered security services and cryptographic framework 
that provide an infrastructure for creating cross-platform, interoperable, security-enabled applications for client-server 
environments. CDSA covers all the essential components of security capability, to equip applications for electronic 
commerce and other business applications with security services that provide facilities for cryptography, certificate 
management, trust policy management, and key recovery.  
CDSAv2 is scalable such that it can provide security services for any device, ranging from Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDAs) to Mainframes, and any operating platform from Windows to UNIX / LINUX. Incorporating the CDSA 
solution into enterprise environments effectively decouples any single security solution from the infrastructure, and 
integrates a mechanism (EMM) that allows you to plug and unplug security solutions as required. 
CDSA is a security middleware specification and reference implementation that is open source, cross-platform, 
interoperable, extensible, and freely exportable. 
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Department of Defense, the Orange book classifications5 is a set of important guidelines 
to follow.   There are also security related specifications and recommendations from other 
groups such as BS 7799 / ISO 177996, CISSP7 and Common Criteria8.   
                                                                                                                                                 
---------------- 
5
 The divisions of systems recognized under the trusted computer system evaluation criteria are as follows. Each 
division represents a major improvement in the overall confidence one can place in the system to protect classified and 
other sensitive information.   
Division (D): Minimal Protection   
This division contains only one class. It is reserved for those systems that have been evaluated but that fail to meet the 
requirements for a higher evaluation class.   
Division (C): Discretionary Protection   
Classes in this division provide for discretionary (need-to-know) protection and, through the inclusion of audit 
capabilities, for accountability of subjects and the actions they initiate.   
Division (B): Mandatory Protection   
The notion of a TCB that preserves the integrity of sensitivity labels and uses them to enforce a set of mandatory access 
control rules is a major requirement in this division. Systems in this division must carry the sensitivity labels with 
major data structures in the system. The system developer also provides the security policy model on which the TCB is 
based and furnishes a specification of the TCB. Evidence must be provided to demonstrate that the reference monitor 
concept has been implemented.   
Division (A): Verified Protection   
This division is characterized by the use of formal security verification methods to assure that the mandatory and 
discretionary security controls employed in the system can effectively protect classified or other sensitive information 
stored or processed by the system. Extensive documentation is required to demonstrate that the TCB meets the security 
requirements in all aspects of design, development and implementation.   
--------------- 
6
 BS 7799 (ISO 17799) - Key Components of the Standard (Extracted from a write up by Biju 
Mukund, an ISO 17799 / BS 7799 consultant based in India) 
The Standard is divided in two parts: 
BS 7799 Part 1 (ISO 17799.2000 Standard) Code of Practice for Information Security Management 
BS 7799 Part II Specifies requirements for establishing, implementing and documenting Information 
Security Management System (ISMS) 
The standard has 10 Domains, which address key areas of Information Security Management. 
1. Information Security Policy for the organization.  
This activity involves a thorough understanding of the organization business goals and its 
dependence on information security. This entire exercise begins with the creation of an IT Security 
Policy. This is an extremely important task and should convey total commitment of top 
management-. The policy cannot be a theoretical exercise. It should reflect the needs of the actual 
users. It should be implementable, easy to understand and must balance the level of protection 
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with productivity. The policy should cover all the important areas like personnel, physical, 
procedural and technical.  
2. Creation of information security infrastructure  
A management framework needs to be established to initiate, implement and control information 
security within the organization. This needs proper procedures for approval of the information 
security policy, assigning of the security roles and coordination of security across the organization.  
3. Asset classification and control  
One of the most laborious but essential task is to manage inventory of all the IT assets, which 
could be information assets, software assets, physical assets or other similar services. These 
information assets need to be classified to indicate the degree of protection. The classification 
should result into appropriate information labeling to indicate whether it is sensitive or critical and 
what procedure, which is appropriate for copy, store, and transmit or destruction of the 
information asset. 
4. Personnel Security  
Human errors, negligence and greed are responsible for most thefts, frauds or misuse of facilities. 
Various proactive measures that should be taken are, to make personnel screening policies, 
confidentiality agreements, terms and conditions of employment, and information security 
education and training.  
Alert and well-trained employees who are aware of what to look for can prevent future security 
breaches.  
5. Physical and Environmental Security  
Designing a secure physical environment to prevent unauthorized access, damage and interference 
to business premises and information is usually the beginning point of any security plan. This 
involves physical security perimeter, physical entry control, creating secure offices, rooms, 
facilities, providing physical access controls, providing protection devices to minimize risks 
ranging from fire to electromagnetic radiation, providing adequate protection to power supplies 
and data cables are some of the activities. Cost effective design and constant monitoring are two 
key aspects to maintain adequate physical security control. 
6. Communications and Operations Management  
Properly documented procedures for the management and operation of all information processing 
facilities should be established. This includes detailed operating instructions and incident response 
procedures.  
Network management requires a range of controls to achieve and maintain security in computer 
networks. This also includes establishing procedures for remote equipment including equipment in 
user areas. Special controls should be established to safeguard the confidentiality and integrity of 
data passing over public networks. Special controls may also be required to maintain the 
availability of the network services.  
Exchange of information and software between external organizations should be controlled, and 
should be compliant with any relevant legislation. There should be proper information and 
Confidential Page 13 11/25/2010 
                                                                                                                                                 
software exchange agreements, the media in transit need to be secure and should not be vulnerable 
to unauthorized access, misuse or corruption.  
Electronic commerce involves electronic data interchange, electronic mail and online transactions 
across public networks such as Internet. Electronic commerce is vulnerable to a number of 
network threats that may result in fraudulent activity, contract dispute and disclosure or 
modification of information. Controls should be applied to protect electronic commerce from such 
threats. 
7. Access control  
Access to information and business processes should be controlled on the business and security 
requirements. This will include defining access control policy and rules, user access management, 
user registration, privilege management, user password use and management, review of user 
access rights, network access controls, enforcing path from user terminal to computer, user 
authentication, node authentication, segregation of networks, network connection control, network 
routing control, operating system access control, user identification and authentication, use of 
system utilities, application access control, monitoring system access and use and ensuring 
information security when using mobile computing and tele-working facilities. 
8. System development and maintenance  
Security should ideally be built at the time of inception of a system. Hence security requirements 
should be identified and agreed prior to the development of information systems. This begins with 
security requirements analysis and specification and providing controls at every stage i.e. data 
input, data processing, data storage and retrieval and data output. It may be necessary to build 
applications with cryptographic controls. There should be a defined policy on the use of such 
controls, which may involve encryption, digital signature, use of digital certificates, protection of 
cryptographic keys and standards to be used for cryptography.  
A strict change control procedure should be in place to facilitate tracking of changes. Any changes 
to operating system changes, software packages should be strictly controlled. Special precaution 
must be taken to ensure that no covert channels, back doors or Trojans are left in the application 
system for later exploitation.  
9. Business Continuity Management  
A business continuity management process should be designed, implemented and periodically 
tested to reduce the disruption caused by disasters and security failures. This begins by identifying 
all events that could cause interruptions to business processes and depending on the risk 
assessment, preparation of a strategy plan. The plan needs to be periodically tested, maintained 
and re-assessed based on changing circumstances.  
10. Compliance  
It is essential that strict adherence is observed to the provision of national and international IT 
laws, pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), software copyrights, safeguarding of 
organizational records, data protection and privacy of personal information, prevention of misuse 
of information processing facilities, regulation of cryptographic controls and collection of 
evidence. 
Confidential Page 14 11/25/2010 
                                                                                                                                                 
Information Technology’s use in business has also resulted in enacting of laws that enforce responsibility 
of compliance. All legal requirements must be complied with to avoid breaches of any criminal and civil 
law, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations and of any security requirements.  
BS 7799 (ISO 17799) consists of 127 best security practices (covering 10 Domains which was discussed 
above) which companies can adopt to build their Security Infrastructure. Even if a company decides not go 
in for the certification, BS 7799 (ISO 17799) model helps companies maintain IT security through ongoing, 
integrated management of policies and procedures, personnel training, selecting and implementing effective 
controls, reviewing their effectiveness and improvement. Additional benefits of ISMS are improved 
customer confidence, a competitive edge, better personnel motivation and involvement, and reduced 
incident impact. Ultimately leads to increased profitability. 
7
 CISSP defines the following domains – Access control systems and methodology, Telecommunications, 
Network & Internet security, Security management practices, Applications and systems development, 
Cryptography, Security architecture and models, Operations security, Business continuity planning, Law, 
investigation, ethics and forensics and physical security. 
 
8
 In June 1993, the sponsoring organizations of the existing US, Canadian, and European criteria started the 
CC Project to align their separate criteria into a single set of IT security criteria. Version 1.0 of the CC was 
completed in January 1996. Based on a number of trial evaluations and an extensive public review, Version 
1.0 was extensively revised and CC Version 2.0 was produced in April of 1998.  This became ISO 
International Standard 15408 in 1999.  The CC Project subsequently incorporated the minor changes that 
had resulted in the ISO process, producing CC version 2.1 in August 1999. 
Today the international community has embraced the CC through the Common Criteria Recognition 
Arrangement (CCRA) whereby the signers have agreed to accept the results of CC evaluations performed 
by other CCRA members. 
The Common Criteria Project is represented on the web at www.CommonCriteriaPortal.org 
Common Criteria defines the following two sets of requirements for functional classes and assurance 
classes. 
 
Common Criteria Functional Classes 
 
Audit, Cryptographic support, Communications, User data protection, Identification and authentication, 
security management, privacy, protection of security functions, Resource utilization, Access, and Trusted 
paths and channels. 
 
Common Criteria Assurance Classes 
 
Configuration management, Delivery and operation, Maintenance of assurance, Protection file evaluation, 
Development, Guidance document, Lifecycle support, Security target evaluation. 
 
Protection Profile (http://niap.nist.gov/pp/index.html) 
 
A Protection Profile (PP) is an implementation-independent specification of information assurance security 
requirements. Protection profiles are a complete combination of security objectives, security related 
functional requirements, information assurance requirements, assumptions, and rationale.  
The purpose of a PP is to state a security problem rigorously for a given collection of system or products - 
known as the Target of Evaluation (TOE) - and to specify security requirements to address that problem 
without dictating how these requirements will be implemented.  
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Product vendors may respond to the security concerns defined by a PP by producing a Security Target 
(ST), which is similar to a PP except that it contains implementation-specific information that demonstrate 
how their product addresses those security concerns.  
In accordance with their respective responsibilities under Public Law 100-235 (Computer Security Act of 
1987), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
have agreed to cooperate on the development of security requirements for key technology areas necessary 
for the protection of Federal information systems and networks, including those comprising the critical 
infrastructure within the United States. NIST and NSA are undertaking this effort: 
• To ensure the U.S. Government has a consistent comprehensive set of recommended protection 
profiles for key technology areas;  
• To forge partnerships with public and private sector constituencies to develop and gain consensus 
on PPs important for critical infrastructure protection; and  
• To facilitate national and international convergence of protection profiles in key technology areas.  
The following links focus on US Government Protection Profiles and will direct you to either the 
development process for US Government PPs, Consistency Instruction Manuals for different degrees of 
robustness, a list of US Government PPs in development, and, finally, a current list of NIAP Validated US 
Government PPs. 
US government’s protection profiles (http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/pp/index.html) 
 
Anti-Virus  Key Recovery 
 
PKI/KMI  
 
Switches and Routers 
 
Biometrics 
 
Miscellaneous 
 
Remote Access 
 
System Access 
Control 
Certificate Management 
 
Mobile Code 
 
Secure Messaging 
 
Tokens 
 
Firewalls 
 
Multiple Domain 
Solutions 
 
Security 
Management Trusted DBS 
Guards 
 
Network Mgmt Sensitive Data Protection  
VPN 
 
IDS/IPS 
 
Operating System 
 
Single-Level Web 
Server 
 
WLAN 
 
  
Peripheral Switch 
 
Smart Cards   
 
Notes: 
= There is a Validated U.S. Gov't PP available for this technology category of product type. However, it 
should not be inferred that every product listed within this technology category necessarily meets the PP. 
You can be redirected to the PP page for the given technology by clicking on the red or black PP icon. 
= There is a draft U.S. Gov't PP available for this category of product type. However, it should not be 
inferred that every product listed within this product type necessarily meets the PP. Draft PPs can be in 
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SSE-CMM is heavily influenced by the CMMI five layer capability maturity model. 
OCTAVE is a framework for identifying information security risks.  CDSA provides 
specifications for security middleware. 
 
None of these frameworks consider a holistic view of the vulnerabilities, resulting threats 
and their combined impact on business, much less attempt to define an index of any kind 
to represent the state of cyber security health of a business. 
 
This missing link between cyber security risks to their impact on businesses through a 
maturity model and an index / rating provided us the motivation to pursue the work 
reported in this document. 
 
The INFOSeMM IT Security Maturity Model framework has been developed with the 
goal of including all the major factors outlined in the frameworks, specifications and 
methodologies mentioned above. These well thought out frameworks and methodologies 
can be applied, either in part or as a whole, in both determining a business’ INFOSeMM 
maturity level and in helping it to progress to a desired level.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
various stages of development, i.e., being written or vetted, or in evaluation in a NIAP CCEVS CCTL. You 
can be redirected to the PP page for the given technology by clicking on the red or black PP icon. 
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4.  The Solution 
 
 
We examined several frameworks relating to information security and spent several hours 
of brainstorming and soul searching on what guiding principle should drive our effort.  
The following risk assessment table appearing in US GAO AI 339 document turned out to 
be the best starting block.  US GAO synthesized this table after studying the best 
practices across industry segments. 
 
 
Table 1: Risk Assessment Matrix from US Government General Accounting Office 
Probability of Occurrence Severity 
Level 
Frequent Probable Occasional Remote Improbable 
I (high) A A A B C 
II A A B B C 
III A B B C C 
IV (Low) C C D D D 
Source: US General Accounting Office report GAO / AIMD-00-33 on Risk Assessment Practices 
 
A – Risk 1 (Undesirable and requires immediate corrective action) 
B – Risk 2 (Undesirable and requires corrective action, but some management 
discretion allowed)  
C – Risk 3 (Acceptable with review by management) 
D – Risk 4 (Acceptable without review by management) 
 
We debated and discussed whether the model should capture three, four or five levels of 
IT security maturity of an organization.  However the table in the GAO document helped 
us settle the debate and it turns out that there was no need for more than four levels. 
 
4.1. The model 
 
We call the four level model INFOSeMM, standing for INFOSYS IT Security Maturity 
Model.  The maturity levels are determined by a business’ posture towards reviewing and 
revising its vulnerabilities along three main dimensions – Infrastructure, Intelligence and 
Practices.  We call these the three pillars of IT security maturity level of any 
                                                 
9
 Information Security Risk Assessment – Practices of leading organizations, GAO/AIMD-00-33, Accounting and 
Information Management Division, US General Accounting Office. 
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organization. It is these three pillars that ensure the stability of an organization from an 
information security perspective. 
 
 
Figure 2: The three information security pillars of a company 
 
Each of the three pillars can in turn be defined in terms of their key components.  These 
definitions are provided below. 
 
a. Infrastructure  
 
We classify the following three under infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
 
• V1 – Network  
• V2 – System 
• V3 – Environment 
 
Network vulnerabilities will include issues related to firewalls, VPNs, Network forensics, 
advanced boundary controllers, etc. 
 
System vulnerabilities will include issues related to Operating Systems, Servers, 
Domains, Security Architecture, etc. 
 
Environment vulnerabilities will include issues related to earthquakes, environmental 
pollution, terrorism, etc. 
Company 
Infrastructure Intelligence Practices 
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b. Intelligence 
 
We classify the following two under Intelligence vulnerabilities. 
 
• V4 – Applications 
• V5 – Data 
 
Application vulnerabilities will include issues related to malicious code, application 
forensics, access control of applications etc. 
 
Data vulnerabilities will include issues related to privacy, confidentiality, unauthorized 
disclosure, non-delivery or misdelivery of information, etc. 
 
c. Practices 
 
We classify the following three under the Practices vulnerabilities. 
 
• V6 – People 
• V7 – Processes 
• V8 – Management 
 
People vulnerabilities will include issues such as creating information security awareness 
amongst employees and others interacting with the company and monitoring the 
violations and enforcement of the security policies. 
 
Processes will include issues such as creating, maintaining, and retiring information 
security related policies. 
 
Management will include issues related to risk assessment and mitigation, contingency 
plans etc. 
 
The following table shows how the different vulnerabilities across the three pillars map 
into the considerations under different security efforts. 
 
Table 2: Mapping of the eight INFOSeMM vulnerabilities to other frameworks. 
Vulnerabilities 
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Tenets of Security   
                
Protecting   
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Confidentiality   
        
X 
      
Integrity   
      
X 
        
Availability   
  
X X 
          
Avoiding   
                
Destruction   
    
X 
          
Alteration   
      
X X 
      
Disruption   X X X 
          
Accountability   
              
X 
Non-repudiation   
  
X 
            
  Test V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
CISSP Domains   
                
Access control systems 
and Methodology 
  
  
X   X X 
      
Telecommunications, 
Network & Internet 
Security 
  X 
              
Security Management 
Practices 
  
              
X 
Applications and 
Systems Development 
  
      
X 
        
Cryptography   
  
X 
            
Security Architecture 
and Models 
  
  
X 
            
Operations Security   
            
X X 
Business Continuity 
planning 
  
    
3 
          
Law, Investigation, 
Ethics and Forensics 
  
            
X X 
Physical Security   
                
  Test V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
SSE-CMM   
                
PA01 Administer 
Security Controls 
      X         X 
PA02 Assess Impact                   
PA03 Assess Security 
Risk 
                  
PA04 Assess Threat                   
PA05 Assess 
Vulnerability 
  X X X X X X X X 
PA06 Build Assurance 
Argument 
                  
PA07 Coordinate 
Security 
              X   
PA08 Monitor Security 
Posture 
                X? 
PA09 Provide Security 
Input 
          X?       
PA10 Specify Security 
Needs 
        
  
      X 
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PA11 Verify and 
Validate Security 
  
              
X 
  Test V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
Common Criteria   
                
Security Functional 
Classes (of 
requirements) 
  
                
Audit                 4 
Cryptographic Support     X             
Communications   X               
User Data Protection           X       
Identification and 
Authentication 
              X   
Security Management                 X 
Privacy           X       
Protection of Security 
Functions (??) 
              X   
Resource Utilization                 X? 
Access (?)     X   X         
Trusted paths / 
channels 
  X?               
Security Assurance 
Classes 
  
                
Configuration 
Management 
    X             
Delivery and Operation                   
Maintenance of 
Assurance 
              X X 
Protection profile 
evaluation (?) 
              X X 
Development (?)               X X 
Guidance document (?)               X   
Lifecycle support               X   
Security target 
evaluation (?) 
              X   
Tests B1-
B4 
                
Vulnerability 
assessments 
B1-
B4 
X X X X X X X X 
 Test V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 
4.2. Threats 
 
Vulnerabilities do not lead to risks in isolation.  It is the threats in combination with 
vulnerabilities that lead to business and operational risks.  There were initial thoughts on 
whether the threats ought to influence the maturity index.  We finally decided that for the 
purposes of assessing the IT security maturity it would be most prudent to assume that 
threats exist at the highest levels.  Of course, the extent the threat is real becomes an 
important consideration when it comes to security related investments. 
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We discuss the threat – vulnerability relationship later on in this document.  At that time 
we will also discuss the vertical or domain context that needs to be integrated into 
security planning. 
 
a. Human threats 
 
The following table presents the source, motivation and actions for threats from human 
beings. 
 
Table 3:   Threats from human beings: Source, Motivation and Actions  
Source Motivation Actions 
Hacker, cracker • Challenge 
• Ego 
• Rebellion 
• Hacking 
• Social Engineering 
• System intrusion, break-ins 
• Unauthorized system access 
Computer Criminal • Destruction of 
Information 
• Illegal information 
disclosure 
• Monetary gain 
• Unauthorized data 
alteration 
 
• Computer crimes such as 
cyber-stalking. 
• Fraud such as replay, 
impersonation, and 
interception. 
• Information bribery 
• Spoofing 
• System intrusion 
Terrorist • Blackmail 
• Destruction 
• Exploitation 
• Revenge 
• Bomb 
• Information warfare 
• DOS, DDOS 
• System penetration 
• System tampering 
Corporate espionage • Competitive advantage 
• Economic advantage 
• Access to strategic and 
competitive proprietary 
information  
• Information theft 
• Intrusion on privacy 
Insiders 
• Poorly trained 
• Disgruntled 
• Malicious 
• Negligent 
• Dishonest 
• Terminated 
• Curiosity 
• Ego 
• Intelligence 
• Monetary gain 
• Revenge 
• Unintentional errors 
o Data entry 
o Programming 
o Unsecured 
terminals 
• Assault on another employee 
• Blackmail 
• Browsing unauthorized 
information 
• Corrupt / Falsify data 
• Information theft / bribery 
• Malicious code 
• Sale of personal / confidential 
information 
• System sabotage 
Adapted from:  NIST Risk Management Guidelines 
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b. Threat-Vulnerability relationships 
The following table presents some examples of interplay between Vulnerability and 
Threat. 
 
Table 4: Sample Vulnerability threat relationships 
Vulnerability Threat-source Threat-action 
Employee’s system 
identifiers and privileges 
are not removed 
immediately on termination. 
Terminated employees who 
are disgruntled. 
• Accessing company 
proprietary data. 
• Corrupting company 
information. 
• Compromising privacy 
by accessing data on 
fellow employees for 
the purposes of selling 
or blackmail. 
Company firewall allows 
inbound Telnet and guest 
ID is enabled on one of the 
servers. 
Unauthorized users 
including former 
employees. 
Using Telnet to browse 
using the guest ID. 
New security patches are 
not applied promptly. 
Unauthorized users 
including former 
employees. 
Exploiting known system 
vulnerabilities to access 
sensitive information. 
Data center uses water 
sprinklers to suppress fire 
without providing for 
suitable cover for hardware 
and other equipment. 
Negligent persons, 
disgruntled employees or 
arsonists with no 
connection to the company. 
Hardware ruined when 
water sprinklers are turned 
on in the data center. 
Adapted from:  NIST Risk Management Guidelines 
4.3. Domain / Vertical Dependence 
 
The maturity level that an organization should operate in is to a large extent determined 
by the industry that the company operates in.  The following table from Gartner gives the 
likely hood of a politically motivated attack on critical infrastructure across different 
industries.  
 
Table 5: Estimates for the likelihood of a politically motivated cyber attack on 
verticals. 
 Comm. Financial 
Services 
Manufac 
turing 
Utilities Transport Government Other 
Very 
Likely 
9.1% 18.8% 23.8% 9.1% 18.2% 37.5% 13.3% 
Somewhat 
likely 
40.9% 40.6% 23.8% 36.4% 45.5% 37.5% 40.0% 
Total 50% 59.4% 47.6% 45.5% 63.7% 75.0% 43.3% 
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Source: Gartner Research June 2003. 
 
Gartner Research has also carried out analyses on the applications in a vertical that attract 
attacks.  The following table provides one such example for the financial services group. 
 
Table 6: Sample targets for attack in the financial industry 
 Cash Flow Credit Infrastructure 
People Bank Accounts Credit cards Investment Future 
Industry Sales and 
Receivables 
Credit facilities Infrastructure 
Financial markets Settlements and 
Transactions 
Credit facilities Depositories and 
other markets 
Source: Gartner research 2003 
 
Hence it is important to customize the maturity level requirements for both a given 
industry and the applications within that industry. 
 
4.4. Expected benefits from IT Security investments 
 
The basic tenet of security can be classified into protection and avoidance.  Protection 
normally addresses Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.  Avoidance addresses 
Destruction, Alteration and Disruption.  We present the key protection benefits in Table 
7, key avoidance benefits in Table 8 and key business benefits in Table 9. 
 
Table 7:  Key Benefits from IT security investments for protection purposes 
Vulnerabilities 
secured 
through IT 
security 
investments 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
Infrastructure Protects the 
network identity 
thus avoiding 
incidents such as 
phishing. 
Preserves network 
and system integrity. 
Improves system and 
network uptime. 
Intelligence Protects privacy 
and proprietary 
information. 
Preserves data and 
application integrity. 
Improves control of 
access to applications 
and data 
Practices Protects process 
and policy 
innovations. 
Preserves the 
integrity of policies. 
?? 
 
 
 
Table 8: Key benefits from IT security investments for avoidance purposes 
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Vulnerabilities 
secured 
through IT 
security 
investments 
Destruction Alteration Disruption 
Infrastructure Investment in 
continuity ensures 
operations even 
when destruction is 
caused by elements 
of nature or arson. 
Investment in 
Network Address 
Translation will 
minimize the 
hijacking of 
infrastructure.  
Investment in 
infrastructure 
redundancy 
minimizes disruption. 
Intelligence Investment in AAA 
(Authorization, 
Access Control and 
Authentication) 
and rights 
management 
eliminates possible 
destruction of data 
and applications. 
Investment in AAA 
(Authorization, 
Access Control and 
Authentication) and 
rights management 
eliminates possible 
changes to data and 
applications. 
Investment in hot 
stand bys ensures 24 
x 7 availability of 
data and applications 
thus eliminating 
disruption. 
Practices Investment in 
Process 
Management 
Systems eliminates 
possible corruption 
of policies and 
processes. 
Investment in Process 
Management Systems 
eliminates possible 
alteration of policies 
and processes. 
Investment in hot 
stand bys ensures 24 
x 7 availability of 
policies and 
processes thus 
eliminating 
disruption. 
 
 
Table 9: Key business benefits from adequate IT security investments. 
Impact on Business Vulnerabilities 
Business 
Development 
Regulatory 
wrath 
Business Costs Management 
Time 
Infrastructure Happy 
customers 
become 
spokespersons 
for the 
company. 
 
Compliance 
with service 
level 
requirements 
saves potential 
fines and 
minimizes 
business 
disruption. 
Service 
restorations 
costs are 
contained. 
Management 
time is freed for 
strategic 
decision 
making. 
Intelligence Customer 
retention is 
easier. 
Compliance 
with privacy 
and 
confidentiality 
Legal costs 
related to 
privacy and 
confidentiality 
Management 
can feel assured 
that the 
proprietary and 
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requirements 
saves potential 
fines and 
business 
stoppage. 
saved. personal 
information is 
well protected.  
Results in 
reduced costs 
related to 
potential 
blackmail. 
Practices New customer 
acquisition is 
easier. 
Compliance 
with 
recommended 
security 
policies and 
standards 
avoids potential 
fines and 
business 
stoppage. 
Contingency 
plans minimize 
restoration 
time.  Well 
thought out 
policies help 
reduce 
insurance 
premiums. 
Accountability 
processes 
ensures 
problems are 
identified at the 
earliest and 
managed well. 
 
4.5. IT Security Maturity Levels 
 
Given that the intent was to ascertain the extent of preparedness of an organization for 
handling threats from Cyber security attacks, we first needed to find a reasonable 
representation for the probability of attacks.  We were not very comfortable with the 
GAO’s terminology of Frequent, Probable, Occasional, Remote and Improbable.  We 
replaced these with Frequent, Intermittent, Occasional, Rare and Very rare (or 
negligible).  We felt that the revised labeling was less ambiguous than the ones originally 
used.   
 
We then needed a good system of labeling the responses.  Organizations may have been 
either ignorant of the impact of information security on them or even when they were 
fully aware may not have the resources to respond.  This state will correspond to level 1.    
Some organizations may have recognized the need to respond to such threats and may 
have been quite satisfied by committing initial investments.  Such organizations are 
generally classified to be in level 2.  Some diligent organizations may have realized the 
need to address the continuing onslaught of cyber attacks and hence would have 
instituted regular review and revision of their level of preparedness.  These organizations 
will operate in level 3.  Very few organizations might decide to be proactive in their 
approach to managing such cyber attacks.  These organizations will be proactive in 
anticipating future attacks, drawing up suitable response plans and might even conduct 
simulated attacks to assess the level of preparedness of their systems and people.  These 
organizations will be operating in level 4 of the Maturity model. 
 
Not all organizations need to operate at level 4.  The level at which an organization needs 
to operate will be largely determined by the industry segment in which it operates.  Even 
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where the industry segment requires an organization to operate at the highest level, there 
may be several applications within an organization which need not operate at the highest 
levels.  For example, if we broadly divide the enterprise applications into internal and 
external (client and business facing), the internal applications can often operate at a lower 
maturity level than the external applications. 
 
The four maturity levels for the three pillars are presented in Table 9.  The benefits and 
pains at each of these four maturity levels are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Maturity levels for the three pillars. 
 
 
a. Threat scenarios, likelihoods and impacts 
 
Maturity Level Infrastructure Intelligence Practices Index range 
One:      
Inactive 
Infrastructure 
(network, 
system and 
environment) is 
not secured. 
Intelligence 
(application and 
data) is not 
secured. 
Practices 
(people, 
process and 
management) 
are not secured. 
DDD 
Two:     
Reactive 
Infrastructure is 
secured in 
response to 
incidents. 
Intelligence is 
secured in 
response to 
incidents. 
Practices are 
secured in 
response to 
incidents. 
cDD, DcD, 
DDc to CCC 
Three: 
Streamlined 
Infrastructure is 
secured for 
known 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions.  The 
solutions are 
streamlined 
with other two 
pillars. 
Intelligence is 
secured for 
known 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions.  The 
solutions are 
streamlined 
with other two 
pillars. 
Practices are 
secured for 
known 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions.  The 
solutions are 
streamlined 
with other two 
pillars. 
bCC, CbC, 
CCb to BBB 
Four:    
Proactive 
Infrastructure is 
secured for 
known and 
anticipated 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions. 
Intelligence is 
secured for 
known and 
anticipated 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions. 
Practices are 
secured for 
known and 
anticipated 
vulnerabilities 
through regular 
reviews and 
resulting 
revisions. 
aBB, BaB, 
BBa to AAA 
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Every business will benefit by using event handling data to model scenarios and prioritize 
countermeasures.  The following table captures the threat scenario, likelihood and impact 
on systems and business. 
 
Table 11:  Threat scenario impacts 
 
 
 
 
b. Business benefits and pains at the four maturity levels. 
 
Maturity 
Level 
Threat Scenario Threat 
Likelihood 
Threat  
Impact 
on Systems 
Threat      
Impact on 
Business 
One:      
Inactive 
No attention paid 
to threat 
scenarios 
High to very 
High 
• Significant 
system 
disruption 
• Serious loss 
of critical 
proprietary 
information 
• Significant 
loss of current 
and future 
business 
opportunities 
• Significant 
loss of 
revenues 
Two:     
Reactive 
Limited scenario 
modeling 
Medium to 
high 
• Intermittent 
system 
disruption 
• Intermittent 
loss of 
proprietary 
information 
 
• Intermittent 
loss of current 
and future 
business 
opportunities 
• Intermittent 
loss of 
revenues 
Three: 
Streamlined 
Scenario 
modeling is used 
to determine 
priorities of 
countermeasures 
Low to 
Medium 
• Occasional 
system 
disruption 
• Occasional 
loss of 
proprietary 
information 
 
• Occasional 
loss of current 
and future 
business 
opportunities 
• Occasional 
loss of 
revenues 
Four:    
Proactive 
Event handling 
data is used to 
revise scenario 
modeling and 
prioritization of 
countermeasures. 
Rare to Low • Rare system 
disruption 
• Rare loss of 
proprietary 
information 
 
• Rare loss of 
current and 
future 
business 
opportunities 
• Rare loss of 
revenues 
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The benefits and pains that a business will experience while operating at the different 
levels are listed in the following table.  
 
Table 12: Benefits / pains accruing to a business at different maturity levels 
Maturity 
Level 
Benefits Pains Concerns 
One:      
Inactive 
No benefits.   • Customer morale is 
very low.  High 
chances of losing 
existing customers. 
• New customer 
acquisitions are 
extremely difficult. 
• New product 
development is 
severely affected. 
• Uncontrolled exposure 
to regulatory fines and 
hike in insurance 
premiums. 
• Unplanned demands 
on top level 
management’s time. 
• Significant loss of 
revenues. 
• Uncontrolled exposure 
to blackmail and legal 
costs arising out of 
privacy related issues. 
• Significant reductions 
in volume of business 
transactions and 
revenues. 
No company will 
wish to operate at 
this level if they 
can afford to set 
aside sufficient 
funds. 
Two:     
Reactive 
• Most customers are 
happy most of the 
time. 
• New customer 
acquisitions are 
easier.  
• New product 
development is 
mostly unaffected. 
• Exposure to 
regulatory fines and 
hike in insurance 
• A few customers are 
occasionally unhappy. 
• New customer 
acquisitions are 
sometimes difficult. 
• Occasional problems 
experienced in new 
product development.  
• Partial exposure to 
hike in insurance 
premiums.  
• Possible short term 
• The general 
emphasis is to 
plug in 
security holes 
as and when 
they are 
discovered. 
This approach 
might be 
adopted more 
due to lack of 
funds for a 
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premiums is 
lowered. 
• Demand on top 
management time is 
significantly 
reduced. 
• Loss of revenues is 
contained. 
• Exposure to 
blackmail is 
contained. 
• Reduction in the 
volume of business 
transactions and 
revenues contained. 
stoppage of business 
due of lack of total 
compliance to 
regulatory 
requirements. 
• Demands on mid level 
management’s time. 
• Moderate reductions in 
volume of business 
transactions and 
revenues 
 
streamlined 
solution rather 
than because 
of lack of 
appreciation 
for 
streamlining. 
 
• It might be 
useful to 
totally secure 
individual 
domains one 
by one than 
partially 
securing all of 
them. 
Three: 
Streamlined 
• Almost all the 
customers are happy 
all the time. 
• New customer 
acquisition is easy. 
• Exposure to 
regulatory fines or 
hike in insurance 
premiums is 
minimal.  
• Well designed 
contingency plans 
significantly reduce 
the need for 
management time. 
• Minor exposure to 
blackmail. 
• Demand on lower level 
management time. 
• Minor exposure to 
legal costs related to 
privacy issues. 
• Minor reductions in 
volume of business 
transactions and 
revenues. 
• This approach 
will need 
more planning 
and 
investments. 
• End to end 
solutions need 
to be thought 
through. 
• Security 
solutions 
should not 
hamper 
smooth 
functioning of 
businesses. 
Four:    
Proactive 
• Existing customers 
are satisfied and 
help in the 
acquisition of new 
customers. 
• Exposure to 
regulatory fines is 
eliminated. 
• Insurance premiums 
can be negotiated 
down. 
• Demands on 
management time 
No known pains. • It is important 
to understand 
the ROI on 
information 
security 
investments if 
a company is 
in a domain 
that does not 
warrant its 
operations at 
this level. 
• All 
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The model is organized into the following components. 
 
I. Firm components 
a. Three pillars. 
b. Four maturity levels. 
II. Flexible components 
a. Considerations for determining the maturity level. 
b. Mandatory maturity level for each consideration. 
c. Transition Plans. 
d. Recommended maturity level for an industry vertical. 
 
eliminated. 
• Exposure to 
blackmail and legal 
costs arising from 
privacy issues is 
negligible. 
information 
security 
solutions 
should not 
affect the 
speed and 
convenience 
of usage. 
Confidential Page 32 11/25/2010 
 
 
Figure 3: The fixed and variable parts of the INFOSeMM framework. 
Three Pillars 
Four Maturity  Levels 
Considerations 
Mandatory Maturity Level for 
each consideration 
Recommended maturity level for 
a given industry vertical 
Fixed part of the 
framework 
 
 
 
 
  Flexible part of 
the framework. 
  Some samples 
given.  
 
  Review and 
revision from 
experienced 
consultants 
and pilots on a 
continual 
basis. 
Transition Plans 
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5. The Transition. 
 
Businesses will first need to assess their current INFOSeMM maturity level.   Then they 
need to decide the maturity level at which they wish to operate10.   
 
Once the desired maturity level is identified, transition plans to migrate to the desired 
maturity level need to be drawn up and implemented.  Some organizations may prefer to 
make the transition in small steps in order to optimize the use of their resources.  Others 
might be willing to migrate to the desired level in one step.  This is a decision to be made 
by the executive management team of the organization.  Transition plans for the 
vulnerabilities will include questionnaires that will help assess the current maturity level 
and the recommended set of actions to be taken to get to the desired maturity level.  
 
a. Maturity Assessment 
 
We have developed a starting set of questionnaires to assess the maturity level of an 
organization along each of the three pillars.  For each pillar, we also provide guidelines 
for deriving the maturity level. 
 
b. Considerations for the questionnaires 
 
The ideal scenario would be for the set of considerations across all the eight 
vulnerabilities s be MECE (mutually exclusive and collectively Exhaustive) and that all 
of them be at the same level of granularity. However, often the nature of considerations 
for different each of the dimensions will require that some of them be at a different level 
of granularity than the others.  So, this starter set of considerations should be evolved to 
MECE considerations of near about equivalent granularities. 
 
This is a very tough task, in being able to choose a level of detail, sticking consistently to 
that level of detail, making sure everything at that level of detail is captured in the 
questionnaire. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that while there is a vast library 
of public literature on security, there is no agreed-upon classification, beyond the top 
level.  Also, some of them might cut across more than one dimension.  For example, the 
Management dimension might look at the access control issues and formulate policies 
which will then be encased in the Practices dimension.  Depending upon the type of 
access control, this consideration will also have to be reflected in either the Application 
or Data dimension. 
 
Future work might concentrate on a guided descent into the questions, instead of a direct 
descent. For instance for Network, it would mean, breaking the network into its 
constituent components. 
                                                 
10
 Infosys consultants should work with their Domain Competency Group to determine the maximum 
recommended maturity levels for each of the industry verticals.  The consultant should also work with the 
Enterprise Systems group to determine the recommended maturity level for each of the applications in a 
typical enterprise in each of the verticals. 
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a. LAN 
b. Extranet / VPN 
c. Intranet 
d. Internet 
 
Then this can perhaps intersect with the maturity level on the following factors:  
 
a. Deployment 
b. Deployment & Testing 
c. Deployment, Testing and Purchasing / building 
 
One could take the major aspects of user-interaction within each of these stages as the 
next dimension 
 
a. Identification, Authentication and Authorization 
b. Accountability, Non-repudiation 
c. Incident handling (Forensics would be discovered if one choose to descend one 
level lower) 
 
One could develop questions which are points along, one, two or three of the above 
(dimensions).   
 
A related effort would be to identify the hierarchies under each of the main eight 
dimensions (Network, Management) such that the sub-dimensions of each of the 
dimensions at the same level or roughly at the same level of granularity. 
 
Given the short development period and lack of access to the security aware, client facing 
consultants, we offer the considerations in section 5.1. as an initial starter set. The 
considerations from which the questionnaires for the eight vulnerabilities across the three 
pillars need to be maintained by designated security consultants.  They need to be 
reviewed and refined on a regular and proactive basis by designated consultants and 
disseminated to all other security consultants in the organization to enforce consistency in 
delivery. 
 
c. Transition Plans 
 
Table 12 presents the set of transition plans that need to be developed in order to migrate 
any company from the lowest maturity index to the highest maturity index. The transition 
plans are best developed by the Infosys consultants based on the starter kit of 
questionnaires used to assess a company’s maturity index.  Given that the questionnaires 
are living documents and will be customized for different industries and different client 
engagements, the transition plans have to be maintained to be in synch with the 
questionnaires. 
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d. Ownership 
 
Who owns IT security maturity assessment and transition?  Some companies assign the 
ownership to the IS/ IT groups.  Others assign it to a Chief Security Officer.  Yet others 
elevate this to the Chief Risk Officer.  The best results have been obtained when the 
policies are set at the corporate level with inputs from the divisions and the deployment 
and policy enforcement is made a KPI of all the divisions, business and functional.  It is 
best for each division to report their IT security health during their quarterly reviews on 
par with their other KPIs such as revenue, profitability, etc.  Hence the design and 
adoption of transition plans should involve the divisions of a company as well. 
 
e. Security and System Development Life Cycle 
 
Security should be considered an integral part of a system development lifecycle.  
Application development should treat security at a functional level and not at a specific 
solution / component offering level.  For example, an application that treats 
authentication at a functional level will give itself the flexibility to use solutions as and 
when they emerge. Those applications that ignore such practices may end up hard coding 
a specific authentication solution.  Such hard coded specific solution based approaches 
promise to impose significant security related reengineering and maintenance demands 
on the application. 
 
Table 14. captures the relationship between the Engineering Principles recommended for 
US Federal Systems Division and the Life Cycle phases.  We show how these principles 
relate to the vulnerabilities (V1 to V8) considered by our maturity model.
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Table 13: Transition plans for progressing from one maturity level to the next. 
Transitions Vulnerabilities Inactive to 
Reactive 
Reactive to 
Streamlined 
Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Network Network 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Network 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Network 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
System System 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
System 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
System 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
Infrastructure 
Environment Environment 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Environment 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Environment 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
Applications Application 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Application 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Application 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
Intelligence 
Data Data 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Data 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Data 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
People People 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
People 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
People 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
Process Process 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Process 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Process 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
Practices 
Management Management 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan I 
Management 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
II 
Management 
vulnerability 
assessment and 
transition plan 
III 
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Table 14: Information Technology Security Engineering principles versus Life-cycle 
phases (** indicates Key to the phase, * optionally used to support the phase) 
Life-cycle applicability  
 
 
Principle (from Federal Systems 
Guidelines for EP-ITS 
engineering Principles) 
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a
tio
n
 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t/ 
 
A
cq
u
isi
tio
n
 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
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R
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a
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d 
V
u
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a
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1.Establish a sound security policy 
for design 
** * * * * V4 
2. Treat security as an integral part 
of overall system design. 
** ** ** ** * V2 
3. Clearly delineate the physical and 
logical security boundaries 
governed by associated security 
policies 
 ** * *  V7 
4. Reduce risk to an acceptable 
level 
** ** ** ** ** V8 
5. Assume that external systems are 
insecure 
** ** ** ** * V1 
6. Identify potential trade-offs 
between reducing risk and increased 
costs and decrease in operational 
effectiveness. 
** **  **  V8 
7. Implement layered security 
(Remove any single point of 
vulnerability) 
* ** * ** * V2 
8. Implement system security 
measures tailored to meet 
organizational security goals 
* ** * ** * V8 
9. Strive for simplicity * ** * **  V7 
10. Design and operate an IT 
system to limit vulnerability and to 
be resilient in response. 
* **  **  V7 
11. Minimize the number of system 
elements to be trusted. 
* ** * **  V7 
12. Implement security through a 
combination of physical and logical 
measures. 
 ** * * * V8 
13. Provide assurance that the 
system is, and continues to be, 
resilient in the face of expected 
* ** * ** * V8 
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Life-cycle applicability  
 
 
Principle (from Federal Systems 
Guidelines for EP-ITS 
engineering Principles) 
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threats. 
14. Limit or contain vulnerabilities  ** * *  V1-V8 
15. Formulate security measures to 
address multiple overlapping 
information domains. 
* ** * *  V7 
16. Isolate public access systems 
from mission critical resources. 
* ** * *  V2,V1 
17. Use boundary mechanisms to 
separate computing systems and 
network infrastructures. 
 ** * **  V2 
18. Where possible base security on 
open standards for portability and 
interoperability. 
* ** *   V7 
19. Use common (layman’s) 
language in developing security 
requirements. 
** **  **  V8 
20. Design and implement audit 
mechanisms to detect unauthorized 
use and to support incident 
investigations. 
* ** ** *  V7,V8 
21. Design security to allow for 
regular adoption of new technology, 
including a secure and logical 
technology upgrade process. 
 ** * **  V1,V2 
22. Authenticate users and 
processes to ensure appropriate 
access control decisions both within 
and across domains (and intra, inter 
and extra nets) 
* * * **  V2,V4 
23. Use unique identities to ensure 
accountability 
* * * **  V2 
24. Implement least privilege * * * **  V7,V2 
25. Do not implement unnecessary 
security mechanisms 
* ** ** * * V2 
26. Protect information while being 
processed, in transit and in storage. 
* ** * ** * V1,V4,V5 
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Life-cycle applicability  
 
 
Principle (from Federal Systems 
Guidelines for EP-ITS 
engineering Principles) 
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27. Strive for operational ease of 
use 
* ** * **  V7 
28. Develop and exercise 
contingency or disaster recovery 
procedures To ensure appropriate 
availability 
* * * **  V3 
29. Consider custom products to 
achieve adequate security 
* ** * *  V2 
30. Ensure proper security in the 
shut down or disposal of a system 
 *  * ** V7 
31. Protect against all likely classes 
of “attacks” 
* ** ** * * V7 
32. Identify and prevent common 
errors and vulnerabilities. 
 ** **   V7 
33. Train the developers to write 
secure software 
** ** *   V3 
Adapted from: NIST Risk Management Guidelines 
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5.1. Considerations for developing questionnaires to assess 
maturity index. 
 
This section presents a starter kit of consideration that can be used for generating the 
questionnaires to assess the INFOSeMM maturity index of an organization.  The 
questionnaires should identify the gaps between the desired positioning and the current 
positioning for all the vulnerabilities. 
 
We should emphasize that these considerations are a starter kit.  Firstly, they need to be 
reviewed by consultants for the completeness.  We might have included items that the 
consultants might feel are not very important for certain verticals and we might have 
omitted some that they would like to introduce for the vertical.  Every one of the 
considerations addressed in the questionnaires should be classified into either mandatory 
or optional for any level. The level number listed under the column “Maturity Level” 
indicates the level at which a consideration becomes mandatory. That consideration 
therefore, by definition, will be optional at the lower levels. These considerations will be 
used in determining the maturity level of an organization against each of the 
vulnerabilities.  Each of the consideration should be exploded into its components based 
on the client need. 
 
We use the terms ‘regular or periodic’ and ‘proactive’ when referring to the review and 
revision of individual features considered through out the different sets of considerations 
for the questionnaires.  The word regular / periodic implies that the reviews and revisions 
are carried out based on regular time intervals as chosen by an organization. For example, 
some organizations might choose to review their vulnerabilities every quarter and the 
others might choose to review semi-annually or even annually.  All of these will fall 
under the category ‘regular’.  We use the word ‘proactive’ to indicate that the 
organizations are committed to review and revise the features as and when needed based 
on either an alert or an anticipation.  Clearly the costs involved in a proactive posture will 
be more than that involved in a regular posture.  This precisely reflects the extent of 
management commitment to maintain the good IT security health of a company. 
 
When the vulnerabilities are better managed, the business costs of an organization are 
reduced and the customer and business partner satisfaction levels increased.  Satisfied 
and happy customers and business partners can in turn become the “unpaid” marketing 
agents for a company’s products and services. 
 
An organization is said to be at a given level of IT security maturity when all the 
mandatory features at that level are satisfied.  
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5.1.1. Considerations for generating the questionnaires for assessing 
the maturity index for the infrastructure pillar. 
 
The infrastructure pillar is made up of three subgroups – Network, System and 
Environment. 
 
Table 15: Network maturity assessment considerations. 
Network maturity related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Intranet11 Not secure Secure Secure Secure 2 
Internet12 Not secure Not secure Secure Secure 3 
Extranet13 Not secure Not secure Not secure Secure 4 
Network disruption  None Have a passive 
backup. Cold 
standby. 
Have an active 
backup. Hot 
standby. 
Proactive 
disruption 
planning and 
management. 
As stated 
Boundary controllers None  Basic firewall Advanced 
boundary 
controllers 
Adaptive 
boundary 
controllers 
As stated 
Denial of service None Denial of 
service 
prevention 
Denial of 
service 
avoidance 
Distributed 
denial of 
service 
prevention and 
avoidance 
As stated 
Design principles for secure 
network services and 
protocols14 
None Yes Reviewed and 
updated on 
regular basis  
Proactive 
affordable 
network 
security 
design.  
2 
Security for collaborative 
environments  
None For corporate 
use only 
For use within 
corporate and 
with customers 
(CRM apps) 
For use within 
corporate, with 
customers and 
business 
partners 
3 
                                                 
11
 Intranet – private enterprise network. 
12
 Internet – Global Internet.  Enterprise policy can only enforce requirements upon those devices accessing 
the enterprise network. 
13
 Extranet – a protected version of the Enterprise network and is often protected by a Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ). 
14
 Most enterprise networks are logically separated into the following domain: 
User domain – Physical location of the user and the type of network equipment used to access corporate 
information. 
Transport domain – Public and / or part of the enterprise network that is used to connect other domains. 
Bastion domain – Webservers, mail gateways, and application gateways. 
Data domain – main frames, database servers, and application servers. 
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Shared services based on 
Grid computing 
None For corporate 
use across 
business 
functions  
For corporate 
use across 
business 
functions and 
key customers 
of the client.  
For corporate 
use across 
business 
functions key 
customers, 
business 
partners of 
client. 
optional 
Deployment, testing and 
validation of network 
security tools and 
mechanisms 
Deployed Deployed. 
Tested in 
response to an 
incident 
Deployed. 
Tested and 
validated on a 
regular basis. 
Deployed. 
Proactively 
tested and 
validated. 
2 
Anonymity in networks None Static mapping 
to an IP 
address 
Dynamic IP 
mapping for 
fixed durations 
Dynamic IP 
mapping for 
every 
transaction 
As stated 
Accountability in networks None Batch audit  Small interval 
audit  
Real time audit As stated 
Network forensics None Basic  Advanced  Adaptive 
(intelligent) 
As stated 
Method of adoption of new 
network security technology 
None Ad hoc Against a 
defined 
architecture 
Against a 
seamless 
extensible 
architecture 
As stated 
Streamlining all network 
security related components 
None Discretionary Mandatory Verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes 
business 
continuity by 
managing 
network and 
connectivity 
failures 
Improves 
business 
continuity by 
minimizing 
network and 
connectivity 
failures 
Assures 
business 
continuity by 
proactively 
avoiding 
network and 
connectivity 
failures 
 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
 
 
Table 16: System maturity assessment considerations. 
System maturity related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Operating system  Vanilla Hardened Continuous 
review and 
update of 
hardening  
Trustworthy 
authenticated 
architecture set 
up 
2 
Server Vanilla Hardened Continuous 
review and 
update of 
hardening  
Trustworthy 
authenticated 
architecture set 
up 
2 
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Middleware Static  Hardening 
requirements 
reviewed on a 
need basis 
Hardening 
requirements 
reviewed and 
revised on a 
regular basis 
Trustworthy 
authenticated 
architecture set 
up 
3 
IT System Static  Reviewed on a 
need basis 
Reviewed and 
revised on a 
regular basis 
Trustworthy 
authenticated 
architecture that 
considers 
security as 
integral part of 
system design 
As stated 
Security domains Not addressed Reviewed on a 
need basis 
Reviewed and 
revised on a 
regular basis 
Dynamic review 
and revision  
As stated 
Securing trust levels None Public 
information 
secure 
Proprietary 
information 
secure 
Private 
information 
secure 
As stated 
Configuration 
management 
Normal Reviewed on a 
need basis 
Reviewed and 
revised on a 
regular basis 
Dynamic review 
and revision  
As stated 
Visual rendition of 
system architecture 
None Basic coarse 
grain 
visualization 
Fine grain 
visualization 
Demand based 
dynamically 
adaptive 
coarse/fine grain 
visualization 
As stated 
Authorization None Implemented Reviewed and 
revised on a 
regular basis 
Role based and 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised 
2 
Access control None Fine grained 
discretionary 
access control 
Mandatory 
access control 
Verified access 
control 
2 
Authentication None Single factor 
weak  
Two factor 
strong 
authentication 
implemented  
Multifactor role 
based strong 
authentication 
implemented 
2 
End to end encryption Not verified Verified at the 
time of 
initiation 
Regularly 
reviewed and 
revised 
Verified in real 
time 
3 
Installation of latest 
security patches 
Not updated Updated based 
on 
alerts/incidents 
Regularly 
updated  
Proactive 
prioritized 
updates 
2 
Backup and recovery None Ad hoc batch Regular and fine 
grained 
Real time fine 
grained 
3 
Availability/disruption of 
systems 
No backup 
provided 
Have a passive 
backup. Cold 
standby. 
Have an active 
backup. Hot 
standby. 
Proactive 
disruption 
planning and 
management. 
As stated 
Layered security Single point of 
vulnerability 
exists 
Single point of 
vulnerability 
minimized 
Single point of 
vulnerability 
avoided 
System updates 
continue to avoid 
single point of 
vulnerability   
2 
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Method of adoption of 
new systems security 
technology 
None Ad hoc Against a 
defined 
architecture 
Against a 
seamless 
extensible 
architecture 
4 
Non repudiation None Sender 
verified 
Sender and 
receiver verified 
Sender and 
receiver 
verification 
without 
involvement of 
trusted third 
party 
As stated 
Privacy/Confidentiality None Data privacy 
provided 
Data and user 
privacy provided 
User profile 
protected 
As stated 
Streamlining all system 
security related 
components 
None Discretionary Mandatory Verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes 
business 
continuity by 
managing 
consequences 
due to system 
disruption or 
damage and 
loss of 
proprietary 
information 
Improves 
business 
continuity by 
minimizing 
system 
disruption and 
damage and loss 
of proprietary 
information 
Assures 
business 
continuity by 
proactively 
avoiding 
consequences 
due to system 
disruption and 
damage and loss 
of proprietary 
information 
 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this activity becomes mandatory 
 
Table 17: Environment maturity assessment considerations. 
Environment maturity 
related considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Disaster management plan None Implemented Implemented and 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised 
Implemented and 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised 
2 
Provision for resumption of 
lost service 
None Cold site 
implemented 
Cold and hot site 
implemented 
Cold and hot site 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised 
A stated 
Duplicated critical systems 
and applications 
None Implemented Implemented and 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised 
Implemented and 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised in real-
time 
2 
Communications lines  Single  Duplicate paths 
established 
Multiple paths 
established 
Multiple paths 
established and 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised 
As stated 
Storage and backup of 
critical data 
Onsite only Offsite storage 
implemented 
sporadic backups 
Backup at offsite 
on a regular 
basis  
Backup at 
Offsite on a real-
time basis  
As stated 
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Rotate backup media  Not done Done on monthly 
basis  
Done on a 
weekly basis  
Done on a daily 
basis 
2 
Test the disaster 
management plan  
Not done Implemented Implemented and 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised 
Implemented and 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised 
As stated 
Recovery of data and 
services 
One day  Few hours Few minutes to 
an hour 
Instantaneous 2 
Monitoring potential 
disasters 
Ad hoc  Weekly Daily Hourly 2 
Streamlining all 
environmental components 
that affect information 
security 
Not implemented Discretionary Mandatory Verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes 
business 
continuity by 
managing 
consequences 
due to potential 
environmental 
disaster. 
Improves 
business 
continuity by 
minimizing 
consequences 
due to potential 
environmental 
disaster. 
Assures 
business 
continuity by 
proactively 
avoiding 
consequences 
due to potential 
environmental 
disaster. 
 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
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5.1.2. Considerations for generating the questionnaires for assessing 
the maturity index for the intelligence pillar. 
 
The Intelligence pillar is made up two subgroups – Applications and Data. 
 
Table 18: Considerations for Application maturity assessment. 
Application maturity 
related considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Security Wrappers for  
legacy applications 
None some legacy 
applications 
provided with 
security 
wrappers 
All legacy 
applications  
with regular 
review and 
revision of 
definition of 
legacy 
All legacy 
applications 
with proactive 
review and 
revision of 
definition of 
legacy 
3 
Malicious Code 
Detection 
Not 
implemented 
Implemented Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Implemented 
real time with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
2 
End to end 
information flow 
certification 
Not 
implemented 
Discretionary Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Verified real 
time with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
3 
Application audit for 
information security 
compliance and 
integrity 
Not 
implemented 
Discretionary Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Verified with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
3 
Application forensics Not 
implemented 
Implemented Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Verified real 
time with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
2 
Revision control of 
sensitive applications 
Not 
implemented 
Implemented Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Verified with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
2 
Information security 
and Application 
Development 
Methodology  
As an 
afterthought 
Integrated into 
SDLC (ISIDLC 
- Information 
security 
integrated 
SDLC) 
ISIDLC 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised to 
maintain 
compatibility 
with new IT 
security 
solutions 
ISIDLC 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised to 
maintain 
compatibility 
with new IT 
security 
solutions 
2 
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Access control of  
applications 
Not 
implemented 
Implemented Implemented 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Verified with 
proactive 
review and 
revision 
2 
Application 
availability 
Single point 
of failure 
Have a passive 
backup. Cold 
standby. 
Have an active 
backup. Hot 
standby. 
Proactive 
disruption 
planning and 
management. 
As stated 
Sensitivity level of the 
applications 
No 
application 
sensitivity 
tables created 
and 
maintained 
Some 
application 
sensitivity tables 
created.  
Application 
sensitivity 
tables created 
and maintained 
with regular 
review and 
revision 
Application 
sensitivity 
tables created 
and maintained 
with proactive 
review and 
revision 
3 
Path between 
application and 
information storage 
Unsecured Partially secured Path security 
regularly 
reviewed and 
revised  
Path security 
proactively 
reviewed and 
revised  
3 
Streamlining all 
application security 
related components 
Nor 
implemented 
Discretionary Mandatory Verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes 
business 
retention and 
growth through 
application 
availability and 
protection 
against 
malicious code 
Improves 
business 
retention and 
growth 
through 
streamlined 
application 
availability 
and protection 
against 
malicious code 
Assures 
business 
retention and 
growth  
through 
proactive 
management 
of application 
availability 
and 
protection 
against 
malicious 
code 
 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
 
 
Table 19: Considerations for data maturity assessment. 
Data maturity related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Separation of users and 
data 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Labeling of major data 
structures 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Integrity of labels for the 
data structures 
not 
considered 
discretionary discretionary verifiable 4 
Sensitivity analyses of the 
data (protection -critical 
Vs. Non protection - 
critical) 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Confidential Page 48 11/25/2010 
data integrity not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Rights management not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Fine grain access control 
of data 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
User access of data direct mediated 
with 
mandatory  
access 
control 
mediated 
with 
mandatory 
access 
control 
mediated 
with 
verifiable 
access 
control 
As stated 
data audit not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
mechanisms to prevent 
unauthorized disclosure of 
data 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Mechanisms to prevent 
non-delivery of data 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Mechanisms to prevent 
mis-delivery of data 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Mechanisms for 
preventing the inadvertent 
destruction of data 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Mechanisms for 
preventing the inadvertent 
modification of data 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Data encryption for 
storage 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Data encryption for 
communication 
not 
considered 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Application independent 
data flow 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Streamlining all data 
security related 
components 
not 
considered 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Ensures  
business 
growth by 
managing 
the 
potential 
loss of  
critical 
proprietary 
information 
Improves 
business 
growth by 
minimizing 
the loss of 
critical and 
other 
proprietary 
information 
Assures 
business 
growth by 
avoiding 
the loss of 
critical 
proprietary 
and private 
information 
 
discretionary (level 2) - divisions are aware of the needs and are given the discretion to adopt and 
implement the feature; review and revision is discretionary 
discretionary (level 3) - divisions are aware of the needs and are given the discretion to adopt and 
implement the feature; regular review and revision is mandatory 
mandatory (level 2) - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement the 
feature; regular review and revision is discretionary 
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mandatory (level 3) - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement the 
feature; regular review and revision is mandatory 
Verifiable - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement the feature and are 
also required to provide verifiable evidence that the implementation and efficacy; proactive review and 
revision is mandatory 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
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5.1.3. Considerations for generating the questionnaires for assessing 
the maturity index for the Practices pillar. 
 
The practices pillar consists of three subgroups – People, Processes and Management.   
 
Table 20: Considerations for people maturity assessment 
People Maturity 
related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Information 
security 
awareness 
not 
implemented 
mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Security training 
requirements 
not 
implemented 
mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Training targets not identified mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Training 
compliance 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
User 
accountability for 
login procedures 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
User 
accountability for 
virus updates 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
User 
accountability for 
timely upgrades 
and other patches 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
Briefing of 
information 
security policy 
updates 
not 
implemented 
mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Incidence 
response training 
not 
implemented 
mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Consequences of 
security policy 
violations 
not 
implemented 
mandatory 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
2 
Security policy 
violation 
enforcements 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
User 
acknowledgement 
of security policy 
requirements 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation  
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
 
Streamlining all 
user related IT 
security 
components 
not 
implemented 
discretionary 
implementation 
mandatory 
implementation 
verifiable 
implementation 
3 
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Business Impact 
 Manages 
business losses 
due to willful 
or inadvertent 
security 
violations at all 
touch points. 
Minimizes 
business losses 
due to willful 
or inadvertent 
security 
violations at all 
touch points. 
Assures 
avoidance of 
business losses 
due to willful 
or inadvertent 
security 
violations at all 
touch points. 
 
discretionary implementation - managers have the discretion to decide which employees are covered; 
review and revision is also discretionary 
mandatory implementation (level 2) - all employees must covered; regular review and revision is 
discretionary 
mandatory implementation (level 3) - all employees must covered; regular review and revision is 
mandatory 
verifiable implementation -  implies random tests to verify the training etc.; proactive review and revision 
is mandatory 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
 
 
Table 21: Considerations for process maturity assessment. 
Process maturity 
related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Process for 
generating the 
taxonomies of 
security domains 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Process for 
building resilient 
systems 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Process for real-
time detection of 
attacks and 
interdiction 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Process for 
determining 
most likely 
attacks 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Process for 
determining 
countermeasures 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Process for 
threat scenario 
simulation and 
forecasting 
not 
implemented 
discretionary discretionary verifiable 4 
Process for 
threat 
prioritization 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Process for 
adversary 
classification 
and mitigation 
not 
implemented 
discretionary discretionary verifiable 4 
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strategy 
Processes for 
risk identification 
and mitigation 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies for 
information 
security 
management  
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
distributing 
defense point 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Regulatory 
policies and 
processes 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Advisory policies 
and processes 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Informative 
policies and 
processes 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
authentication 
services 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
installation of 
latest security 
patches 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
virus protection 
software 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
software 
hardening 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
hardware 
hardening 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
server 
segmentation 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
latest upgrades 
and service 
packs 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
entitlement 
services 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
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Policies and 
processes for 
verification 
services 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
Privacy services 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
back up 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
recovery 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
policies and 
processes for 
incident 
response 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
checking 
compliances 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
disaster 
management 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
non repudiation 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
aligning physical 
and cyber 
securities 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
monitoring and 
adoption of 
emerging 
information 
security related 
standards, 
frameworks and 
methodologies 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
enforcement 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
monitoring 
vulnerabilities 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
risk management 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Confidential Page 54 11/25/2010 
Policies and 
processes for 
security 
coordination 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
protecting 
security 
functions 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
configuration 
management 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
operational risk 
management 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Policies and 
processes for 
maintenance of 
assurance 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 4 
Policies and 
processes for 
protection profile 
evaluation 
not 
implemented 
mandatory mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
security target 
evaluation 
not 
implemented 
discretionary mandatory verifiable 2 
Policies and 
processes for 
ownership of all 
security related 
policies and 
processes 
not 
implemented 
discretionary - 
corporate level  
mandatory - 
corporate 
level 
verifiable - 
corporate 
level 
2 
Streamlining IT 
security related 
policies and 
processes 
Not 
implemented  
discretionary mandatory verifiable 3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes 
management 
of business 
continuity 
and growth 
problems by 
defining 
appropriate 
processes and 
policies. 
Minimizes 
business 
continuity 
and growth 
related 
problems by 
constant 
review and 
revision of 
security 
processes 
and policies. 
Avoids 
business 
continuity 
and 
growth 
related 
problems 
by 
proactive 
review and 
revision of 
security 
processes 
and 
policies. 
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discretionary (level 2) - divisions are aware of the needs but are given the discretion to adopt and 
implement policies and processes; review and revision is discretionary 
discretionary (level 3) - divisions are aware of the needs but are given the discretion to adopt and 
implement policies and processes; regular review and revision is mandatory 
mandatory (level 2) - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement 
the policies and processes; regular review and revision is discretionary 
mandatory (level 3) - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement 
the policies and processes; regular review and revision is mandatory 
Verifiable - all divisions are aware of the needs and are required to adopt and implement the 
policies and processes and are also required to provide verifiable evidence that the implementation 
and efficacy; proactive review and revision is mandatory 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
 
Table 21: Considerations for assessment of Management maturity. 
Management 
maturity related 
considerations 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Mandatory 
maturity 
level 
Division level 
accountability 
not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Risk assumption not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Risk avoidance not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Risk limitation not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Risk planning not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Risk research not managed discretionary 
management 
discretionary 
management 
mandatory, 
verifiable 
management 
4 
Risk 
transference 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Preventive 
management 
security controls 
not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Detection 
management 
security controls 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Recovery 
management 
security controls 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Security 
categorization 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Security 
functional 
requirements 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Security 
assurance 
requirements 
not managed mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
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Security 
requirements 
assessment and 
planning  
 mandatory 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
2 
Security 
certification 
not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Security 
accreditation 
not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Disposal  not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Disaster 
management 
planning 
not managed discretionary 
management 
mandatory 
management 
verifiable 
management 
3 
Assured 
outsourcing 
not managed discretionary 
management 
discretionary 
management 
verifiable 
management 
4 
Risk reward 
analyses 
not managed discretionary 
management 
discretionary 
management 
verifiable 
management 
4 
Streamlining all 
security related 
management 
not managed Discretionary 
management 
Mandatory 
management 
Verifiable 
management 
3 
Business Impact 
 Establishes a 
framework 
for managing 
security 
related 
business risks 
Minimizes 
security 
related 
business risks 
by constantly 
reviewing 
and revising 
the 
framework 
Avoids 
security 
related 
business risks 
by 
proactively 
reviewing and 
revising the 
framework.  
 
Discretionary management (level 2) - Scope, review and revision is at the discretion of the 
divisional level managements 
Discretionary management (level 3) - Scope is at the discretion of the divisional level managements, 
regular review and revision is mandatory 
Mandatory management (level 2) - Scope is predefined,  review and revision is discretionary 
Mandatory management (level 3) - Scope is predefined, regular review and revision is mandatory 
Verifiable management - Scope is predefined and proactive verifiable review and revisions 
Mandatory maturity level - Indicates the level from which this consideration becomes mandatory 
 
5.1.4. Methodology for deriving INFOSeMM maturity ratings. 
 
Let us recall how we derived maturity rating / index for each of the three pillars. 
 
Deriving a maturity rating for infrastructure. 
 
Network and systems have to be streamlined and hence will together form the minimum 
block for the infrastructure pillar.  Hence, the rating at levels 2, 3, and 4 will not be 
bumped up if only one of these two is satisfied.  Environmental disruptions can have an 
effect on the other two components and hence needs to be handled separately. 
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If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for Network and Systems, then the rating for the 
infrastructure pillar is a 'c'.  If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the infrastructure pillar is a 'C'.     
 
If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for Network and Systems, then the rating for the 
infrastructure pillar is a 'b'.  If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the infrastructure pillar is a 'B'.     
 
If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for Network and Systems, then the rating for the 
infrastructure pillar is an 'a'.  If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the infrastructure pillar is an 'A'.     
 
Deriving a maturity rating for intelligence pillar. 
 
Intelligence pillar is made up of Applications and data.  Both need to be secured.  
However, there is really no preferred order of securing them.  We bump up the rating into 
a small case rating at the next level if only one of them is satisfied.   
 
If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for Applications or Data, then the rating for the 
intelligence pillar is a 'c'.  If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for both the subgroups 
then the rating for the intelligence pillar is a 'C'.     
 
If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for Applications or Data, then the rating for the 
intelligence pillar is a 'b'.  If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for both the subgroups 
then the rating for the intelligence pillar is a 'B'.     
 
If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for Network and Systems, then the rating for the 
intelligence pillar is an 'a'.  If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for both the subgroups 
then the rating for the intelligence pillar is an 'A'.  
   
Deriving a maturity rating for Practices. 
 
Processes subgroup is the most important of the three.  There is no means of ensuring 
security if the processes are not implemented even if the other two subgroups are 
implemented.  Hence the ratings do not change if the Processes subgroup is not satisfied.  
When the processes subgroup alone is satisfied we bump up the rating to a small case 
letter at the next level. Once the processes subgroup is satisfied, the other two (people 
and management) need to be satisfied in order for the rating to be changed to an upper 
case letter.  Some people might prefer that not just processes but that combined with 
management should form the minimum block.  This has to be examined before adoption. 
 
If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for Processes subgroup alone, then the rating for 
the practices pillar is a 'c'.  If the level 2 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the practices pillar is a 'C'.     
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If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for Processes subgroup alone, then the rating for 
the practices pillar is a 'b'.  If the level 3 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the practices pillar is a 'B'.     
 
If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for Processes subgroup alone, then the rating for 
the practices pillar is an 'a'.  If the level 4 requirements are satisfied for all the subgroups 
then the rating for the practices pillar is an 'A'.     
 
Minimum and Maximum Maturity ratings at different levels. 
 
Level 1 
 
The only maturity rating at Level 1 is DDD. 
 
Level 2 
 
The minimum maturity rating in this level will be cDD or DcD or DDc and the maximum 
maturity rating is CCC.   
 
Level 3 
 
The minimum maturity rating in this level will be bCC or CbC or CCb and the maximum 
maturity rating is BBB. 
 
Level 4 
 
The minimum maturity rating in this level will be aBB or BaB or BBa and the maximum 
maturity rating is AAA. 
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5.2. Transition plans. 
 
Transition plans help migrate a company from the current maturity level to the desired 
maturity level15.  This migration might happen through a few intermediate steps or 
through a single giant step.  The migration strategy will be influenced by the type of 
organization and their priorities.  Also companies might choose to selectively migrate to 
higher levels for some of the considerations. 
 
Inactive to Reactive transitions (also called transition plan I) 
 
This is where Infosys might have the greatest consulting and follow on IT services 
business potential.  Migrating from the inactive to reactive levels will require “filling the 
security gaps”.  The consulting assignments will involve asking the right questions to 
determine the maturity level along each of the three pillars.  A starter set of questions 
have been presented under the “Consideration for questionnaires” section. A consultant 
needs to customize the questions to match the industry and the client.  The consultant will 
use eight customized questionnaires to identify the gaps in each of the eight 
vulnerabilities V1 to V8.    
 
As is evident from this list, the study will encompass all the eight vulnerabilities.  
Proposed solutions might be ad-hoc and piece meal to satisfy the budgetary constraints or 
the commitment levels of the organization. 
 
Reactive to Streamlined transitions (also called transition plan II) 
 
This transition consists of two subsets.  First subset will consist of those considerations 
are being addressed for the first time.  The second subset will consist of those 
considerations addressed in the earlier transition and will require periodic review and 
revision.  Periodic review and revision should be conducted at regular intervals.  Each 
consideration might require a different period of regularity.  For example, some of the 
considerations might be revisited every year; where as those considered more important 
might be reviewed every six months or even every quarter.  The client facing consultants 
will have to decide on the appropriate intervals based on the industry domain the client 
belongs to and customer’s sensitivity to the review and revision intervals. 
 
In this transition, the consultant should also study the interdependencies of the different 
vulnerabilities and whether they have been streamlined so that the one upstream that is 
the weakest link does not compromise the goodness created by the well secured link 
downstream.  Also, the streamlining effort should ensure that there is a well matched 
information flow without any jams created in intermediate points – Jams due to security 
breaches or simply the performance characteristics of the different devices in the chain. 
 
Streamlined to Proactive transitions (also called transition plan III) 
                                                 
15
 These transition plans are derived from and are dependent on the considerations in sections 5.1.1.1 
through 5.1.3.3.  Any changes in those considerations will alter the transition plans accordingly. 
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This transition also consists of two subsets.  First subset will consist of those 
considerations are being addressed for the first time.  The second subset will consist of 
those considerations addressed in the earlier transitions and will require key alert based 
review and revision.  Key alert based review and revision will not wait for the next 
review and revision period.  The management of the company has to define and agree the 
set of key alert events for each of the considerations.  When a key alert event happens, it 
should trigger a review and revision.   The client facing consultants will have to advise 
the type of events that should be classified as key alerts.  These will be influenced by the 
industry domain that the company operates in and the level of a company’s commitment 
to security.  A highly proactive company in an incident sensitive industry domain will 
normally choose to include a large number of events in its key alert set. 
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5.2.1. Network Transition Plans. 
 
Network transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.1.1. Inactive Level to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition addressed topics related to securing a company’s internal network. 
 
 Table 22: Areas of focus for Network Transition Plan I 
1 Intranet. 
2 Network disruption – passive back up. 
3 Basic boundary controllers. 
4 Denial of service – prevention. 
5 Design principles for secure network services and protocols. 
6 Shared services based on Grid computing – across enterprise divisions. 
7 Deployment, testing and validation of network security tools and mechanisms 
8 Anonymity in networks –static mapping. 
9 Accountability in networks – batch audit 
10 Basic network forensics  
11 Ad Hoc method of adoption of new network security technology 
 
5.2.1.2. Reactive Level to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces topics such as a company’s external network addressing its 
customers. 
 
 Table 23: Areas of focus for Network Transition Plan II 
1 Internet. 
2 Network disruption. 
3 Advanced boundary controllers. 
4 Denial of service – avoidance. 
5 Periodic review of design principles for secure network services and protocols. 
6 Security for collaborative environments for enterprise divisions and key customers. 
7 Shared services based on Grid computing for enterprise and its key customers. 
8 Periodic review and revisions of deployment, testing and validation of network security tools and 
mechanisms 
9 Anonymity in networks – dynamic IP mapping during on selected bases. 
10 Accountability in networks – Short interval audit. 
11 Advanced network forensics 
12 Method of adoption of new network security technology 
13 Streamlining all network security related components 
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5.2.1.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition introduces topics such as securing a company’s external network for 
business partners.  
 
 Table 24: Areas of focus for Network Transition Plan III 
1 Extranet. 
2 Network disruption – proactive, key alert based review and revision. 
3 Adaptive boundary controllers 
4 Denial of service – Distributed attack management. 
5 Design principles for secure network services and protocols – affordable network designs. 
6 Security for collaborative environments - corporate, customer and business partner. 
7 Shared services based on Grid computing – divisions, customers and business partners. 
8 Proactive testing and validation of deployment, testing and validation of network security tools and 
mechanisms based on key alerts. 
9 Anonymity in networks – Dynamic IP mapping for every transaction. 
10 Accountability in networks – Real time audit. 
11 Network forensics – Adaptive. 
12 Method of adoption of new network security technology – Seamless extensible architecture. 
13 Streamlining all network security related components – key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability. 
Confidential Page 63 11/25/2010 
 
5.2.2. System Transition Plans. 
 
System transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.2.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition addresses a minimum set of areas needed to secure systems. 
 
 Table 25: Areas of focus for system transition plan I 
1 Operating system 
2 Server 
3 IT System security  - reviewed on a need basis 
4 Security domains – reviewed on a need basis 
5 Securing trust levels – Public information 
6 Configuration management – reviewed on a need basis 
7 Visual rendition of system architecture – coarse grain 
8 Identity Management  
9 Authorization 
10 Access control – Fine grained discretionary 
11 Authentication – weak, single factor 
12 Installation of latest security patches – incident based 
13 Availability/disruption of systems – Cold standby 
14 Layered security – Minimize single point of vulnerability 
15 Non repudiation – Sender verified 
16 Privacy/Confidentiality – data confidentiality 
 
 
5.2.2.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces areas such as proprietary information and fine grained 
visualization of information security architectures. 
 
 Table 26: Areas of focus for system transition plan II 
1 Operating system – periodic review 
2 Server – periodic review 
3 Middleware – hardening 
4 IT System security – periodic review and revision 
5 Security domains – periodic review and revision 
6 Securing trust levels – proprietary information 
7 Configuration management – periodic review and revision 
8 Visual rendition of system architecture – fine grain  
9 Identity Management 
10 Authorization – periodic review and revision 
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11 Access control  
12 Authentication – strong authentication (two factor) 
13 End to end encryption – periodic review and revision 
14 Installation of latest security patches – periodic review and revision 
15 Backup and recovery – fine grained 
16 Availability/disruption of systems – active back up 
17 Layered security – single point of vulnerability avoided 
18 Non repudiation – Sender and receiver verified 
19 Privacy/Confidentiality – data confidentiality and user privacy 
20 Streamlining all system security related components 
 
 
5.2.2.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition introduces areas such as seamless extensible architectures and securing 
private information. 
 
 Table 27: Areas of focus for system transition plan III 
1 Operating system – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
2 Server – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Middleware – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
4 IT System security – trustworthy architecture 
5 Security domains – key alert based review 
6 Securing trust levels – private information 
7 Configuration management – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
8 Visual rendition of system architecture – dynamically adaptable hybrid  
9 Identity Management 
10 Authorization – Role based  
11 Access control – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
12 Authentication – adaptive authentication including multi factor solutions 
13 End to end encryption – verifiable in real time 
14 Installation of latest security patches – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
15 Backup and recovery – real time, fine grained 
16 Availability/disruption of systems – proactive disruption management planning. 
17 Layered security – single point of vulnerability sensitive updates 
18 Method of adoption of new systems security technologies – seamless extensible 
architecture 
19 Non repudiation – Sender and receiver verified without a the need of a trusted third party 
20 Privacy/Confidentiality – data confidentiality, user privacy, user profile protection. 
21 Streamlining all system security related components – key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability. 
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5.2.3. Environment Transition Plans. 
 
Environment transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.3.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition addresses the minimum set of issues related to environment. 
 
 Table 28: Areas of focus for environment Transition Plan I 
1 Disaster management plan 
2 Provision for resumption of lost service – cold stand by 
3 Duplicated critical systems and applications 
4 Communications lines – duplicate paths established 
5 Storage and backup of critical data – sporadic 
6 Rotate backup media – monthly cycle 
7 Test the disaster management plan  
8 Recovery of data and services – within few hours 
9 Monitoring potential disasters – weekly 
 
5.2.3.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition addresses robust back up for business continuity. 
 
 Table 29: Areas of focus for environment Transition Plan II 
1 Disaster management plan – periodic review and revision 
2 Provision for resumption of lost service – Hot and Cold standbys 
3 Duplicated critical systems and applications – periodic review and revision 
4 Communications lines  - multiple paths established 
5 Storage and backup of critical data – at regular intervals 
6 Rotate backup media – weekly 
7 Test the disaster management plan – periodic review and revision 
8 Recovery of data and services – few minutes to less than an hour 
9 Monitoring potential disasters - daily 
10 Streamlining all security components affected by environmental factors 
 
5.2.3.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition focuses mainly on proactive business continuity planning related topics. 
 
 Table 30: Areas of focus for environment Transition Plan III 
1 Disaster management plan – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
2 Provision for resumption of lost service – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Duplicated critical systems and applications – proactive and real time where required 
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4 Communications lines – optimized multiple paths 
5 Storage and backup of critical data – in real time 
6 Rotate backup media – daily 
7 Test the disaster management plan – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
8 Recovery of data and services – instantaneous 
9 Monitoring potential disasters – hourly or less 
10 Streamlining all security components affected by environmental factors – key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability. 
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5.2.4. Applications Transitions Plans. 
 
Application transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.4.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition addresses minimum set of application security related topics. 
 
 
Table 31: Areas of focus for Application Transition Plan I 
1 Security Wrappers for  legacy applications - selected 
2 Malicious Code Detection 
3 Application forensics 
4 Revision control of sensitive applications 
5 Information security and Application Development Methodology - Integrated 
6 Access control of  applications 
7 Application availability – cold standby 
 
 
5.2.4.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces areas such as end to end information certification, application 
sensitivity and audit. 
 
 
Table 32: Areas of focus for Application Transition Plan II 
1 Security Wrappers for all legacy applications 
2 Malicious Code Detection – periodic review and revision 
3 End to end information flow certification – periodic review and revision 
4 Application audit for information security compliance and integrity – periodic review and 
revision 
5 Application forensics – periodic review and revision 
6 Revision control of sensitive applications – periodic review and revision 
7 Information security and Application Development Methodology  -  periodic review and 
revision 
8 Access control of  applications – periodic review and revision 
9 Application availability -  active standby 
10 Sensitivity level of the applications – periodic review and revision 
11 Secure path between application and information storage – periodic review and revision 
12 Streamlining all application security related components 
 
5.2.4.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition focuses mainly on key alert based review and revision for all the areas 
introduced earlier. 
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Table 32: Areas of focus for Application Transition Plan III 
1 Security Wrappers for  legacy applications – current applications designed legacy proof 
2 Malicious Code Detection – key alert based review and revision for verifiability. 
3 End to end information flow certification – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
4 Application audit for information security compliance and integrity – key alert based review 
and revision for verifiability 
5 Application forensics – key alert based review and revision for verifiability. 
6 Revision control of sensitive applications – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
7 Information security and Application Development Methodology – key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability. 
8 Access control of applications – key alert based review and revision for verifiability. 
9 Application availability – key alert based review and revision for verifiability. 
10 Sensitivity level of the applications – key alert based review and revision for verifiability. 
11 Secure path between applications and information storage – key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability. 
12 Streamlining all application security related components – key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability. 
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5.2.5. Data Transitions Plans 
 
Data transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.5.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition addresses a minimum set of data security related topics. 
 
 Table 33: Areas of focus for data transition plan I 
1 Separation of users and data 
2 Sensitivity analyses of the data (protection -critical Vs. Non protection - critical) 
3 data integrity 
4 Rights management 
5 User access of data 
6 Data audit 
7 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent destruction of data 
8 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent modification of data 
9 Data encryption for storage 
10 Data encryption for communication 
 
5.2.5.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces issues related to data delivery and advanced data protection. 
 
 Table 34: Areas of focus for data transition plan II 
1 Separation of users and data – periodic review and revision 
2 Labeling of major data structures – periodic review and revision  
3 Sensitivity analyses of the data – periodic review and revision 
4 data integrity – periodic review and revision 
5 Rights management – periodic review and revision 
6 Fine grain access control of data – periodic review and revision 
7 User access of data – periodic review and revision 
8 Data audit – periodic review and revision 
9 Mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data – periodic review and revision 
10 Mechanisms to prevent non-delivery of data – periodic review and revision 
11 Mechanisms to prevent mis-delivery of data – periodic review and revision 
12 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent destruction of data – periodic review and 
revision 
13 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent modification of data – periodic review and 
revision 
14 Data encryption for storage – periodic review and revision 
15 Data encryption for communication – periodic review and revision 
16 Application independent data flow – periodic review and revision 
17 Streamlining all data security related components 
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5.2.5.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition focuses on the integrity of the labels for key data structures and the key 
alert based review and revision of all areas introduced earlier. 
 
 
Table 35: Areas of focus for data transition plan III 
1 Separation of users and data – key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
2 Labeling of major data structures - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Integrity of labels for the data structures - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
4 Sensitivity analyses of the data - key alert based review and revision for verification 
5 data integrity - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
6 Rights management - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
7 Fine grain access control of data - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
8 User access of data - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
9 data audit - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
10 mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of data - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
11 Mechanisms to prevent non-delivery of data - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
12 Mechanisms to prevent mis-delivery of data - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
13 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent destruction of data - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
14 Mechanisms for preventing the inadvertent modification of data - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
15 Data encryption for storage - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
16 Data encryption for communication - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
17 Application independent data flow - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
18 Streamlining all data security related components – key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability. 
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5.2.6. People Transition Plans 
 
People transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.6.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition introduces areas such as basic employee training including consequences 
of security policy violations. 
 
 
Table 36: Areas of focus for people transition plan I 
1 Information security awareness 
2 Security training requirements 
3 Training targets 
4 Briefing of information security policy updates 
5 Incidence response training 
6 Consequences of security policy violations 
 
 
5.2.6.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces user accountability related topics. 
 
 
Table 37: Areas of focus for people transition plan II 
1 Information security awareness - periodic review and revision 
2 Security training requirements - periodic review and revision 
3 Training targets - periodic review and revision 
4 Training compliance - periodic review and revision 
5 User accountability for login procedures - periodic review and revision 
6 User accountability for virus updates - periodic review and revision 
7 User accountability for timely upgrades and other patches - periodic review and revision 
8 Briefing of information security policy updates - periodic review and revision 
9 Incidence response training - periodic review and revision 
10 Consequences of security policy violations - periodic review and revision 
11 Security policy violation enforcements - periodic review and revision 
12 User acknowledgement of security policy requirements - periodic review and revision 
13 Streamlining all people related components for information security 
 
5.2.6.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
 
This transition focuses entirely on key alert based review and revision of all the areas 
introduced earlier. 
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Table 38: Areas of focus for people transition plan 
1 Information security awareness - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
2 Security training requirements - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Training targets - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
4 Training compliance - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
5 User accountability for login procedures - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
6 User accountability for virus updates - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
7 User accountability for timely upgrades and other patches - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
8 Briefing of information security policy updates - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
9 Incidence response training - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
10 Consequences of security policy violations - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
11 Security policy violation enforcements - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
12 User acknowledgement of security policy requirements - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
13 Streamlining all people related components for information security – key alert based review 
and revision for verifiability. 
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5.2.7. Processes Transition Plans 
 
Process transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.7.1. Inactive to Reactive Level. 
 
This transition processes and policies for the most basic information security 
management. 
 
 Table 39: Areas of focus for Processes transition plan I 
1 Process for generating the taxonomies of security domains 
2 Processes for risk identification and mitigation 
3 Policies for information security management  
4 Policies and processes for distributing defense point 
5 Regulatory policies and processes 
6 Informative policies and processes 
7 Policies and processes for authentication services 
8 Policies and processes for installation of latest security patches 
9 Policies and processes for virus protection software 
10 Policies and processes for software hardening 
11 Policies and processes for hardware hardening 
12 Policies and processes for server segmentation 
13 Policies and processes for latest upgrades and service packs 
14 Policies and processes for entitlement services 
15 Policies and processes for verification services 
16 Policies and processes for Privacy services 
17 Policies and processes for back up 
18 Policies and processes for recovery 
19 policies and processes for incident response 
20 Policies and processes for enforcement 
21 Policies and processes for monitoring vulnerabilities 
22 Policies and processes for risk management 
23 Policies and processes for configuration management 
24 Policies and processes for protection profile evaluation 
25 Policies and processes for security target evaluation 
26 Policies and processes for ownership of all security related policies and processes 
 
 
5.2.7.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level. 
 
This transition introduces new topics such as policies and processes for attack detection 
and countermeasures, regulatory compliance, disaster management, and aligning physical 
and cyber security solutions. 
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 Table 40: Areas of focus for Processes transition plan II 
1 Process for generating the taxonomies of security domains - periodic review and revision 
2 Process for building resilient systems 
3 Process for real-time detection of attacks and interdiction 
4 Process for determining most likely attacks 
5 Process for determining countermeasures 
6 Process for threat prioritization 
7 Processes for risk identification and mitigation - periodic review and revision 
8 Policies for information security management - periodic review and revision 
9 Policies and processes for distributing defense point - periodic review and revision 
10 Regulatory policies and processes - periodic review and revision 
11 Advisory policies and processes 
12 Informative policies and processes -  periodic review and revision 
13 Policies and processes for authentication services - periodic review and revision 
14 Policies and processes for installation of latest security patches - periodic review and revision 
15 Policies and processes for virus protection software - periodic review and revision 
16 Policies and processes for software hardening - periodic review and revision 
17 Policies and processes for hardware hardening - periodic review and revision 
18 Policies and processes for server segmentation - periodic review and revision 
19 Policies and processes for latest upgrades and service packs -   periodic review and revision 
20 Policies and processes for entitlement services - periodic review and revision 
21 Policies and processes for verification services - periodic review and revision 
22 Policies and processes for Privacy services - periodic review and revision 
23 Policies and processes for back up - periodic review and revision 
24 Policies and processes for recovery - periodic review and revision 
25 policies and processes for incident response - periodic review and revision 
26 Policies and processes for checking compliances 
27 Policies and processes for disaster management 
28 Policies and processes for non repudiation 
29 Policies and processes for aligning physical and cyber security solutions 
30 Policies and processes for monitoring and adoption of emerging information security related 
standards, frameworks and methodologies 
31 Policies and processes for enforcement - periodic review and revision 
32 Policies and processes for monitoring vulnerabilities - periodic review and revision 
33 Policies and processes for risk management - periodic review and revision 
34 Policies and processes for security coordination 
35 Policies and processes for protecting security functions 
36 Policies and processes for configuration management - periodic review and revision 
37 Policies and processes for operational risk management 
38 Policies and processes for protection profile evaluation - periodic review and revision 
39 Policies and processes for security target evaluation - periodic review and revision. 
40 Policies and processes for ownership of all security related policies and processes - periodic 
review and revision. 
41 Streamlining all policies and processes related to information security. 
 
 
5.2.7.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level. 
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This transition introduces processes for threat simulation and forecasting and adversary 
classification with the necessary mitigation strategies. 
 
 Table 41: Areas of focus for Processes transition plan III 
1 Process for generating the taxonomies of security domains - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
2 Process for building resilient systems - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Process for real-time detection of attacks and interdiction - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
4 Process for determining most likely attacks - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
5 Process for determining countermeasures - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
6 Process for threat scenario simulation and forecasting - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
7 Process for threat prioritization - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
8 Process for adversary classification and mitigation strategy - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
9 Processes for risk identification and mitigation - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
10 Policies for information security management - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
11 Policies and processes for distributing defense point - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
12 Regulatory policies and processes - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
13 Advisory policies and processes - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
14 Informative policies and processes - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
15 Policies and processes for authentication services - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
16 Policies and processes for installation of latest security patches - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
17 Policies and processes for virus protection software - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
18 Policies and processes for software hardening - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
19 Policies and processes for hardware hardening - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
20 Policies and processes for server segmentation - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
21 Policies and processes for latest upgrades and service packs - key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability 
22 Policies and processes for entitlement services - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
23 Policies and processes for verification services - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
24 Policies and processes for Privacy services - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
25 Policies and processes for back up - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
26 Policies and processes for recovery - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
27 Policies and processes for incident response - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
28 Policies and processes for checking compliances - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
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29 Policies and processes for disaster management - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
30 Policies and processes for non repudiation - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
31 Policies and processes for aligning physical and cyber security solutions - key alert based 
review and revision for verifiability 
32 Policies and processes for monitoring and adoption of emerging information security related 
standards, frameworks and methodologies - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
33 Policies and processes for enforcement - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
34 Policies and processes for monitoring vulnerabilities - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
35 Policies and processes for risk management - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
36 Policies and processes for security coordination - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
37 Policies and processes for protecting security functions - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
38 Policies and processes for configuration management - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
39 Policies and processes for operational risk management - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
40 Policies and processes for maintenance of assurance - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
41 Policies and processes for protection profile evaluation - key alert based review and revision 
for verifiability 
42 Policies and processes for security target evaluation - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
43 Policies and processes for ownership of all security related policies and processes - key alert 
based review and revision for verifiability 
44 Streamlining all policies and processes related to information security – key alert based review 
and revision for verifiability. 
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5.2.8. Management Transition Plans 
 
Management transition has three plans – inactive to reactive, reactive to streamlined and 
streamlined to proactive.  The considerations listed are a starter set.  They need to be 
validated by security consultants with their own past experience and future client 
engagements. 
 
5.2.8.1. Inactive to Reactive Level 
 
This transition mainly addresses basic risk management and security requirements. 
 
 
Table 42: Areas of focus for Management transition plan I 
1 Risk assumption 
2 Risk limitation 
3 Risk planning 
4 Risk transference 
5 Detection management security controls 
6 Recovery management security controls 
7 Security categorization 
8 Security functional requirements 
9 Security assurance requirements 
10 Security requirements assessment and planning  
 
5.2.8.2. Reactive to Streamlined Level 
 
This transition introduces new areas such as risk avoidance, preventive management of 
security controls, disposal management and disaster management planning. 
 
 
Table 43: Areas of focus for Management transition plan II 
1 Division level accountability  
2 Risk assumption- periodic review and revision 
3 Risk avoidance 
4 Risk limitation - periodic review and revision 
5 Risk planning - periodic review and revision 
6 Risk transference - periodic review and revision 
7 Preventive management security controls 
8 Detection management security controls - periodic review and revision 
9 Recovery management security controls - periodic review and revision 
10 Security categorization - periodic review and revision 
11 Security functional requirements - periodic review and revision 
12 Security assurance requirements - periodic review and revision 
13 Security requirements assessment and planning - periodic review and revision 
14 Security certification 
15 Security accreditation 
16 Disposal  
17 Disaster management planning 
18 Streamlining all security management related components. 
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5.2.8.3. Streamlined to Proactive Level 
 
This transition introduces new areas such as risk research, risk reward analyses and 
assured outsourcing. 
 
 
Table 44: Areas of focus for Management transition plan III 
1 Division level accountability - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
2 Risk assumption - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
3 Risk avoidance - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
4 Risk limitation - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
5 Risk planning - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
6 Risk research - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
7 Risk transference - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
8 Preventive management security controls - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
9 Detection management security controls - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
10 Recovery management security controls - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
11 Security categorization - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
12 Security functional requirements - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
13 Security assurance requirements - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
14 Security requirements assessment and planning  - key alert based review and revision for 
verifiability 
15 Security certification - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
16 Security accreditation - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
17 Disposal - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
18 Disaster management planning - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
19 Assured outsourcing - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
20 Risk reward analyses - key alert based review and revision for verifiability 
21 Streamlining all security management related components – key alert based review and 
revision for verifiability. 
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6.  Business opportunities for Infosys 
 
Infosys can generate both consulting and IT services business opportunities using the 
framework presented in this report.  Some examples of business opportunities16 are 
presented in tables 14.1 through 14.8. 
 
Table 45: Business opportunities for Infosys in the network maturity domain. 
                                                 
16
 These business opportunities are derived from and are dependent on the considerations listed in sections 
5.1.1.1 through 5.1.3.3.  Any changes in those considerations will accordingly alter the list of business 
opportunities. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to 
Streamlined 
Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Design principles 
for secure network 
services and 
protocols. 
• Assessment for the 
need of secure Grid 
computing for 
shared services. 
• Information security 
audit requirements. 
• Ad-hoc methods for 
adoption of new 
security 
technologies. 
• Security assessment 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Review of design 
principles for 
secure network 
services and 
protocols. 
• Study on secure 
collaborative 
platform 
development. 
• Review 
deployment, testing 
and validation of 
network tools and 
mechanisms. 
• Security assessment 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Cost-benefit 
analysis of 
proactive disruption 
planning and 
management. 
• Affordable network 
security design. 
• Recommendations 
for real-time audit 
(for selected 
industries) 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Secure Intranet. 
• Boundary controller. 
• Passive standby. 
• Basic denial of 
service solutions. 
• Secure shared 
services on Grid 
computing platforms 
for enterprise use. 
• Network anonymity 
solutions. 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Secure Internet 
implementation. 
• Hot standby. 
• Advanced boundary 
controllers. 
• Secure 
collaborative 
environments. 
• Denial of service 
avoidance. 
• Secure Grid based 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Secure extranet 
implementation. 
• Adaptive boundary 
controllers. 
• Distributed denial 
of service (multi-
point attack) 
prevention and 
avoidance. 
• Secure 
collaboration 
Confidential Page 80 11/25/2010 
 
 
 
 
Table 46: Business opportunities for Infosys in the system maturity domain. 
• Network tools and 
mechanisms. 
• Basic network 
forensics. 
shared services for 
business partners. 
• Revised and 
streamlined 
deployment, testing 
and validation of 
network security 
tools and 
mechanisms. 
• Advanced network 
forensics 
environment for 
extranets. 
• Real-time fine-
grained network 
anonymity. 
solutions. 
• Real-time fine-
grained audit. 
• Adaptive network 
forensics. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Incidence based 
review of IT system 
security. 
• Incidence based 
review of 
configuration 
management. 
• AAA 
(Authentication, 
Authorization and 
Access control 
including identity 
management) 
• Patch management. 
• Plans for back up 
and recovery. 
• Study to minimize 
single point of 
vulnerability. 
• Study requirements 
for data privacy. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Periodic review of IT 
system security. 
• Periodic review of 
configuration 
management. 
• Periodic review of 
AAA. 
• Review of end to end 
encryption. 
• Periodic review of 
patch management. 
• Plans for fine grained 
back up and recovery. 
• Study to avoid single 
point of vulnerability. 
• Study requirements 
for client privacy. 
• Study to streamline 
all system security 
related topics. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Advanced review of 
Trustworthy17 IT 
systems. 
• Key alert based 
review of 
configuration 
management. 
• Key alert based 
review of AAA. 
• Prioritization oriented 
patch management. 
• Prioritization based 
real time fine grained 
back up and recovery. 
• Study to maintain the 
prevention of single 
point of vulnerability. 
• Study of a seamless 
and extensible system 
architecture for the 
adoption of new 
security technologies. 
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Table 47: Business opportunities for Infosys in the environment maturity domain. 
• Study requirements 
for client profile 
privacy. 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Hardened OS. 
• Hardened servers. 
• Security domains. 
• Systems for 
securing public 
information. 
• Simple AAA. 
• Coarse grain 
visualization of 
security architecture 
(including a 
dashboard including 
INFOSeMM rating). 
• Business continuity 
solutions for 
intranet. based 
applications. 
• Non-repudiation of 
sender. 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Hardened 
middleware. 
•  Fine grain 
visualization of 
security architecture. 
• Two factor based 
strong AAA. 
• End to end work and 
information flow 
platforms 
• Business continuity 
solutions for intranet 
and internet based 
applications. 
• Non-repudiation of 
sender and receiver 
using a trusted third 
party. 
• Streamlined 
implementation of 
system security. 
Review and revise: 
• Security domains at 
regular intervals. 
 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Seamless, extensible 
security middleware. 
• Adaptive (fine grain 
for regions of interest  
and coarse grain for 
others) visualization 
of security 
architecture. 
• Multi factor based 
stronger AAA. 
• Verifiable end to end 
work and information 
flow platforms. 
• Business continuity 
plans for internet, 
intranet and extranet 
based applications. 
• Seamless architecture 
for the adoption of 
new security 
technologies. 
• Non-repudiation of 
sender and receiver 
without the need for a 
trusted third party. 
Review and revise: 
• Security domains in 
response to key 
alerts. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
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Table 48: Business opportunities for Infosys in the application maturity domain. 
for migration. 
• Natural disasters 
management plan. 
migration. 
• Periodic review of 
natural disaster 
management plan. 
• Study to streamline 
the different 
environment related 
components that 
impact IT security. 
migration. 
• Exceptional review of 
natural disaster 
management plan 
based on key alerts. 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Natural disaster 
management system 
(including 
monitoring). 
• Storage, back up 
and restoration 
systems for critical 
applications and 
data. 
• Disaster 
management 
simulation and 
testing system. 
Periodic review and 
revision of  
• Natural disaster 
management system 
at regular intervals. 
• Storage, back up and 
restoration systems 
for critical 
applications and data. 
• Disaster simulation 
and testing system. 
• Streamlined 
environment 
management system 
for IT security. 
Key alert based review 
and revision of  
• Natural disaster 
management systems. 
• Storage, back up and 
restoration systems 
for critical 
applications and data. 
• Disaster simulation 
and testing system. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Addressing security 
requirements of 
legacy applications 
on a need basis. 
• Study of malicious 
code detection 
methods. 
• Study of application 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Study of the security 
requirements of all 
legacy applications 
• End to end 
information flow 
security certification. 
• Application audit for 
information security 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Application 
development 
methodology that 
separates the 
application from the 
security technology 
as a preemptive 
approach to 
preventing future 
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forensics 
requirements. 
• Study of revision 
and access control 
of sensitive 
applications. 
• Study and adopt an 
Information Security 
integrated System 
Development Life 
Cycle (ISISDLC). 
• Study to implement 
application 
availability. 
• Vertical / domain 
dependent 
application 
sensitivity. 
• Methods to secure 
the path between 
application and 
storage. 
compliance and 
integrity. 
• Study for 
streamlining all 
application security 
related components. 
 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Study of malicious 
code detection 
methods. 
• Application forensics 
requirements. 
• Revision and access 
control of sensitive 
applications. 
• ISISDLC. 
• Application 
availability. 
• Vertical / domain 
dependent application 
sensitivity. 
• Methods to secure the 
path between 
application and 
storage. 
legacy issues for 
current applications. 
 
Key alert based review 
and revision of: 
• Study of malicious 
code detection 
methods. 
• End to end 
information flow 
security certification. 
• Application audit for 
information security 
compliance and 
integrity. 
• Application forensics 
requirements. 
• Revision and access 
control of sensitive 
applications. 
• ISISDLC. 
• Application 
availability. 
• Vertical / domain 
dependent application 
sensitivity. 
• Methods to secure the 
path between 
application and 
storage. 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Security wrappers 
for selected legacy 
applications. 
• Malicious code 
detection solutions. 
• Applications 
forensics. 
• Revision and access 
control of sensitive 
applications. 
• Systems for 
application 
availability. 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Security wrappers for 
all legacy 
applications. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Malicious code 
detection solutions. 
• Application forensics. 
• Revision and access 
control of sensitive 
applications. 
• Systems for 
application 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
•  
Key alert based review 
and revision of: 
• Malicious code 
detection solutions. 
• Application forensics. 
• Revision and access 
control of sensitive 
applications. 
• Systems for 
applications 
availability. 
• Solution for securing 
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Table 49: Business opportunities for Infosys in the data maturity domain. 
• Solution for 
securing the path 
between application 
and data. 
availability. 
• Solution for securing 
the path between 
applications and data. 
• Streamlined 
application security 
management. 
the path between 
applications and data. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Study to optimize 
the separation of 
data and users 
(Orange book C1). 
• Study identifying 
protection critical 
and non-protection 
critical data. 
• Study on data 
integrity. 
• Study on data 
protection. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Study on sensitivity 
labeling of major data 
structures (Orange 
book B). 
• Study on data 
delivery. 
• Study on application 
independent data 
flow. 
• Study for 
streamlining all 
components related to 
data security. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Separation of data 
and users. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Study of integrity of 
sensitivity labeling 
(Orange book B). 
 
Study on verifiability of: 
• Data analyses and 
labeling. 
• Data integrity. 
• Data delivery. 
• Data protection. 
• Separation of data 
from users and 
applications. 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Separation of data 
and users (Orange 
Book C1). 
• Tools for sensitivity 
analyses of data. 
• Systems to protect 
data integrity 
including prevention 
of inadvertent 
destruction or 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Sensitivity labeling of 
major data structures. 
• Data domains based 
on protection critical 
and non-protection 
critical divisions. 
• Robust data delivery 
systems that prevent 
non-delivery, mis-
delivery and 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Systems for integrity 
preservation of data 
sensitivity labeling. 
• Fine grain verifiable 
access control of 
data. 
Verification systems for: 
• Sensitivity labeling of 
major data structures. 
• Rights management. 
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Table 50: Business opportunities for Infosys in the people maturity domain. 
alteration of data. 
• Data encryption for 
storage and 
communications. 
• Data audit systems. 
• Rights management 
of data. 
• Discretionary 
mediated access 
control of data. 
unauthorized 
disclosure of data. 
• Fine grain mandatory 
mediated access 
control of data. 
• Application 
independent 
information flow. 
• Streamlined data 
security management 
system. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Separation of data 
and users. 
• Data audit systems. 
• Data encryption 
systems. 
• Systems for 
preserving data 
integrity. 
• Data delivery. 
• Data protection. 
• Data integrity. 
• Separation of data, 
users and 
applications. 
• Data audit. 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Information security 
awareness training 
requirements and 
training targets. 
• Information security 
policy and violation 
consequences. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Information security 
awareness training 
requirements and 
targets compliance 
testing. 
• User accountability 
for login procedures, 
timely installation of 
security upgrades and 
patches. 
• User 
acknowledgement of 
security policy 
requirements and 
enforcement of 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
•  
Study for the verifiability 
of: 
• Information security 
awareness training 
requirements, training 
targets and their 
compliance. 
• User accountability 
for login procedures, 
timely installation of 
security upgrades and 
patches. 
• Use 
acknowledgement of 
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Table 51: Business opportunities for Infosys in the practices maturity domain. 
violations. 
• Study to streamline 
all security 
components related to 
people. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Information security 
awareness training 
requirements and 
training targets. 
• User accountability 
for login procedures, 
timely installation of 
security upgrades and 
patches. 
 
security policy 
requirements and 
enforcements of 
violations. 
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Information security 
awareness training. 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Systems to capture 
and analyze user 
accountability for 
login procedures, 
timely installation of 
security upgrades and 
patches. 
• Streamlined people 
security management 
system. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Information security 
awareness training. 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Systems for 
verification of 
information security 
awareness training, 
policy briefing, user 
acknowledgement, 
and user 
accountability. 
 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Taxonomy of 
security domains. 
• Policies and 
processes for 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Building resilient 
systems 
• Threat scenario 
simulation, most 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Threat forecasting. 
 
Verification studies of: 
• Taxonomy of security 
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information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity 
management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, 
backup, recovery 
and restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
evaluation, security 
target evaluation, 
and incidence 
response. 
• Policies and 
processes for risk 
identification and 
management, and 
violation 
enforcement. 
• Policies and 
processes for 
identifying owners 
for all the 
information security 
related policies and 
processes. 
likely attack 
forecasting, adversary 
classification, 
planning 
countermeasures, real 
time attack detection, 
and response 
prioritization. 
• Policies and 
processes for 
prioritized 
countermeasures, 
information security 
compliance, disaster 
and business 
continuity 
management, non-
repudiation, adoption 
of emerging solutions 
and standards, 
aligning physical and 
information security 
solutions, security 
coordination, 
advisory policies, 
protecting security 
functions and 
operational risk 
management. 
• Study to streamline 
all IT security related 
policies. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Policies and 
processes for 
information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
domains. 
• Real time attack 
detection and 
response 
prioritization. 
• Policies and 
processes for 
information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, backup, 
recovery and 
restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
evaluation, security 
target evaluation, and 
incidence. 
• Policies and 
processes for 
prioritized 
countermeasures, 
information security 
compliance, disaster 
and business 
continuity 
management, non-
repudiation, adoption 
of emerging solutions 
and standards, 
aligning physical and 
information security 
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security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, backup, 
recovery and 
restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
evaluation, security 
target evaluation, and 
incidence. 
solutions, security 
coordination, 
advisory policies, 
protecting security 
functions and 
operational risk 
management. 
• Resilient systems 
• Threat scenario 
simulation, most 
likely attack 
forecasting, adversary 
classification, 
planning 
countermeasures, real 
time attack detection, 
and response 
prioritization. 
•  
IT services Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Security domains. 
• Processes for 
information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity 
management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, 
backup, recovery 
and restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Resilient systems 
• Threat scenario 
simulation, most 
likely attack 
forecasting, adversary 
classification, 
planning 
countermeasures, real 
time attack detection, 
and response 
prioritization. 
• Processes for 
prioritized 
countermeasures, 
information security 
compliance, disaster 
and business 
continuity 
management, non-
repudiation, adoption 
of emerging solutions 
and standards, 
aligning physical and 
information security 
solutions, security 
Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Systems verifying 
processes for 
information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, backup, 
recovery and 
restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
evaluation, security 
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evaluation, security 
target evaluation, 
and incidence 
response. 
• Processes for risk 
identification and 
management, and 
violation 
enforcement. 
coordination, 
advisory policies, 
protecting security 
functions and 
operational risk 
management. 
• Processes for 
identifying owners 
for all the 
information security 
related policies and 
processes. 
• Streamlined security 
related process 
management system. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Policies and 
processes for 
information security 
management 
including people 
training, adoption of 
regulatory inputs, 
identity management, 
entitlement services, 
verification services, 
privacy services, 
installation of 
security updates and 
patches, software/ 
hardware hardening 
and server 
segmentation, 
configuration 
management, backup, 
recovery and 
restoration, 
vulnerability 
monitoring, 
protection profile 
evaluation, security 
target evaluation, and 
incidence. 
• Processes for 
identifying owners 
target evaluation, and 
incidence,  resilient 
systems, threat 
scenario simulation, 
most likely attack 
forecasting, adversary 
classification, 
planning 
countermeasures, real 
time attack detection, 
response 
prioritization,  
processes for 
prioritized 
countermeasures, 
information security 
compliance, disaster 
and business 
continuity 
management, non-
repudiation, adoption 
of emerging solutions 
and standards, 
aligning physical and 
information security 
solutions, security 
coordination, 
advisory policies, 
protecting security 
functions and 
operational risk 
management. 
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Table 52: Business opportunities for Infosys in the management maturity domain. 
for all the 
information security 
related policies and 
processes 
Nature of 
Business 
opportunity 
Inactive to Reactive Reactive to Streamlined Streamlined to 
Proactive 
Consulting • Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations 
for migration. 
• Risk assumption, 
limitation and 
transference, 
Security controls for 
information security 
incidence detection, 
and recovery, 
security functional 
and assurance 
requirements, 
Security 
categorization, 
requirements and 
assessment 
planning. 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Delegation of 
divisional level 
accountability for 
security health, risk 
avoidance, security 
control for preventive 
management, security 
certification, 
accreditation, 
hardware, software 
and information 
disposal and disaster 
management 
planning. 
• Study to streamline 
all security related 
management 
components. 
Periodic review and 
revision of: 
• Risk assumption, 
limitation and 
transference, Security 
controls for 
information security 
incidence detection, 
and recovery, 
security functional 
and assurance 
requirements, 
Security 
categorization, 
requirements and 
• Security assessment, 
benchmarking and 
recommendations for 
migration. 
• Risk research, 
Assured outsourcing 
and risk reward 
analyses. 
Verifiability of: 
• Risk assumption, 
limitation and 
transference, Security 
controls for 
information security 
incidence detection, 
and recovery, 
security functional 
and assurance 
requirements, 
Security 
categorization, 
requirements and 
assessment planning. 
• Delegation of 
divisional level 
accountability for 
security health, risk 
avoidance, security 
control for preventive 
management, security 
certification, 
accreditation, 
hardware, software 
and information 
disposal and disaster 
management 
planning. 
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assessment planning. • Risk research, 
Assured outsourcing 
and risk reward 
analyses. 
 
IT services  Design, Development 
and Deployment of: 
• Disposal 
management. 
• Disaster 
management. 
• Streamlined security 
management system. 
 
System for verifying: 
• Disposal 
management. 
• Disaster 
management. 
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7. The road ahead 
 
It is important for all concerned to understand that this report and the initial framework is 
only a little beginning step in a relatively long journey.  The desired destination would 
arrive when a refined version of this framework becomes a standard in the information 
security end user community.  Any new concept needs a bowling alley strategy for 
adoption.  Adoption hurdles have killed many a good technology. INFOSeMM adoption 
can be achieved through the following efforts. 
 
a.  Validating the framework through some pilots. 
 
Infosys can use some of its existing customer base to pilot some projects for the 
dual purposes of fulfilling customer needs and refining or redesigning the 
framework based on the feedbacks from the pilots.  Our contact with BCM group 
has given us some pointers.  This is a good beginning.  It would be important for 
Infosys to pilot it on its own corporate network.  The lessons learnt here can be 
used to refine the framework and promote it amongst the visionary early adopter 
client base. 
 
b.   Designating owners  
 
Organizational management experience has clearly proven that goods are 
delivered and responsibility and accountability coexist. It is therefore important to 
establish the required environment for nurturing this framework to grow into a 
mature product.  So, it is important to identify a team of owners from SET Labs 
and IBUs who will be responsible for the  
– Maintaining the consistency and completeness of the maturity level 
considerations. 
– Generating questionnaires based on the eight sets of maturity 
considerations. 
– Maintaining the maturity level designations for each of the considerations. 
– Maintaining the types of client engagements that can use this framework. 
– Maintaining the synchronization between the maturity considerations and 
the INFOSeMM model. 
 
c.   Academic validation through publication in 
– Information systems conferences and journals. 
– Information security management conferences and seminars. 
– Management journals addressing information security. 
 
The publication effort in the conferences and seminars can start right away whereas the 
journal publications would require the results from a couple of pilot studies. 
 
d.   Pushing for adoption as a standard  
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The best approach towards making this a standard would be by getting more and more 
people accept this and thus making this become a de facto standard. 
 
i.  Increased client adoption so that this becomes a de facto standard. 
 
This is best achieved by getting more clients to see value in the maturity 
framework.  This can start once the considerations are firmed up and an internal 
pilot is done. 
 
ii. Promoting INFOSeMM to relevant standard bodies at the right times. 
 
This effort should begin only after several marquee customers have embraced this 
framework. 
 
iii. Showcasing INFOSeMM in relevant tradeshows and industry events. 
 
This effort can begin right away. 
 
iv. Writing about INFOSeMM in trade and business magazines. 
 
This effort can also begin right away. 
 
e. Follow on quantitative work.  
 
This Information Security Maturity framework is a qualitative work.  We expect 
companies to be concerned about the cost-benefit and return on investment analysis that 
will be very quantitative.  Such quantitative work will greatly simplify the adoption of 
this framework. 
 
f.   Self-assessment tool 
 
Infosys may wish to evaluate the need to develop a tool that will allow companies to self-
evaluate their current state of preparedness for handling information security threats.  
Such a tool can earn goodwill among current and future customers and lead to follow on 
engagements. 
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OCTAVE 
 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability EvaluationSM 
(OCTAVESM) Framework, Version 1.0 
 
1 Introduction  
The Networked Systems Survivability (NSS) Program of the Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) has begun developing the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability EvaluationSM (OCTAVESM) framework to describe an information security 
risk evaluation. OCTAVE defines a set of self-directed activities for organizations to 
identify and manage their information security risks. Evaluations that are consistent with 
the OCTAVE framework will be comprehensive and will allow an organization to 
identify the information assets that are important to its mission, the threats to those assets, 
and the vulnerabilities that may expose those information assets to the threats. By putting 
together the information assets, threats, and vulnerabilities, the organization can begin to 
understand what information is at risk. Once it has a picture of the risks, the organization 
can design a protection strategy to reduce the overall risk exposure of its information 
assets.  
This document describes the essential components of OCTAVE, focusing on what each 
process step accomplishes. Issues such as who will perform the steps or how to perform 
them will be addressed in subsequent publications. By issuing this report, we intend to 
initiate a discussion of what elements make up a comprehensive information security risk 
assessment that examines both organizational and technology issues. Over time, as we 
develop and pilot an evaluation method consistent with the OCTAVE framework, we 
anticipate that the details described in this report will be modified. When appropriate, we 
will revise this document and the method to reflect changes based on comments from the 
community as well as on our field experience.  
The current version of OCTAVE comes primarily from the following three sources:  
• Information Security Evaluation (ISE). The ISE is an information security 
vulnerability evaluation developed by the Software Engineering Institute’s 
Networked Systems Survivability Program. It focuses on identifying 
vulnerabilities in an organization’s computing infrastructure. It addresses assets 
and threats implicitly. OCTAVE developers are incorporating the lessons learned 
from the development and delivery of the ISE into the OCTAVE framework and 
method.  
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• Software risk management expertise. OCTAVE is also incorporating many of the 
diagnostic techniques and theories developed by the SEI’s Risk Program, which 
focused on identifying risks to software development projects. Many of the 
principles for OCTAVE’s Phase 1 are derived from work that focused on risk 
management issues facing managers in a software development organization.  
• Surveying the current state of the practice in information security risk 
management. Articles about state-of-the-practice information security 
assessments were examined prior to the development of OCTAVE. This 
information was used to determine what is working in the community and where 
the community could benefit from a self-directed comprehensive information 
security risk assessment. 
   
   
1.1 The Need for OCTAVE  
Information systems are essential to most organizations today. The integrity, availability, 
and confidentiality of information are critical to organizations’ missions. However, few 
organizations focus on their most important information assets when they make decisions 
about protecting their information. For example, a bank might consider its customers’ 
bank records to be one of its important information assets. Likewise, a military 
organization responsible for deploying troops might consider logistical data to be an 
important information asset. Most organizations form their protection strategies by 
focusing solely on infrastructure weaknesses. Those organizations fail to establish the 
effect of the infrastructure weaknesses on information assets, such as bank records or 
logistical data.  
This leads to a gap between the organization’s operational requirements and information 
technology (IT) requirements. Often, the computing infrastructure is set up without the IT 
staff having a clear understanding of the organization’s mission- or business-related 
needs. It is not clear if important information is being adequately protected. Likewise, 
significant effort might be directed toward protecting relatively unimportant information. 
In these situations, the operational or business units of the organization and the 
information technology department are not communicating effectively.  
Often, information protection decisions are made in an ad hoc manner, based on the IT 
department’s prior experience with vulnerabilities and the threats that they currently 
know about. Thus, risks tend not to be systematically managed or are managed by the 
wrong people.  
Most current approaches to information-security risk management tend to be incomplete, 
expert-driven, or both. Most approaches fail to include all the components of information 
security risk (assets, threats, and vulnerabilities). In these cases, the organization has 
insufficient data to fully match a protection strategy to its security risks.  
Many organizations outsource information security risk assessments because they do not 
have in-house capability to perform this vital service. They hire experts to perform risk 
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assessments, and the resulting assessment is only as good as the experts who perform it. 
Often the consumers of such services have no way to understand if the risk assessment 
performed for them is adequate for their enterprise.  
OCTAVE enables organizations to avoid those problems. It defines the essential 
components of a systematic information-security risk assessment. By following the 
OCTAVE framework, an organization can make information-protection decisions based 
on risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical information assets. 
The operational or business units and the departments responsible for the information 
infrastructure work together to address the information security needs of the enterprise. 
OCTAVE thus gives the organization a comprehensive, systematic, context-driven 
approach to managing information-security risks.    
1.2 Overview of OCTAVE  
OCTAVE examines organizational issues and technology issues to assemble a 
comprehensive picture of the information security needs of an enterprise. It contains the 
following phases:  
Phase 1, Build Enterprise-Wide Security Requirements  
Phase 2, Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities  
Phase 3, Determine Security Risk Management Strategy    
Each phase of OCTAVE is designed to produce meaningful results for the organization.  
During Phase 1, information assets and their values, threats to those assets and security 
requirements are identified using knowledge of the staff from multiple levels within the 
organization, along with standard catalogs of information. For example, known threat 
profiles and good organizational and technical practices are used to probe staff members 
for their knowledge of the organization’s assets, threats, and current protection strategies. 
This information can then be used to establish the security requirements of the enterprise, 
which is the goal of the first phase of OCTAVE.  
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Figure 1: OCTAVE Phase 1, Build Enterprise-Wide Security Requirements 
Phase 2 of OCTAVE builds on the information captured during Phase 1 by mapping the 
information assets of the organization to the information infrastructure components (both 
the physical environment and networked IT environment) to identify the high-priority 
infrastructure components. Once this is done, an infrastructure vulnerability evaluation is 
performed to identify vulnerabilities. As in Phase 1, standard catalogs of information are 
used; for example, standard intrusion scenarios and vulnerability information are used as 
a basis for the infrastructure vulnerability evaluation. At the conclusion of Phase 2, the 
organization has identified the high-priority information infrastructure components, 
missing policies and practices, and vulnerabilities. 
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Figure 2: OCTAVE Phase 2, Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Phase 3 of OCTAVE builds on the information captured during Phases 1 and 2. Risks are 
identified by analyzing the assets, threats, and vulnerabilities identified in OCTAVE’s 
earlier phases in the context of standard intrusion scenarios. The impact and probability 
of the risks (also called the risk attributes) are estimated and subsequently used to help 
prioritize the risks. The prioritized list of risks is used in conjunction with information 
from the previous phases to develop a protection strategy for the enterprise and to 
establish a comprehensive plan for managing security risks, which are among the goals of 
Phase 3.  
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Figure 3: OCTAVE Phase 3, Determine Security Risk Management Strategy 
   
   
1.3 Example Scenario  
To illustrate how using OCTAVE can help an enterprise understand its information 
security risks, consider the following example. An enterprise with sensitive financial 
information is interested in understanding and addressing its information security risks. 
The enterprise’s management is concerned that outsiders could have access to financial 
information that could be used for illegal stock trading. The senior managers decide to 
perform a security assessment to understand its risk in this area.  
An outside consulting firm is hired to evaluate the enterprise’s security. The following 
observations are among those identified by the consultants:  
• The enterprise’s firewall is functioning correctly—outsiders would have a hard 
time getting in.  
• There are no back doors into the network.  
• The number of accounts on most servers is limited.  
• Most servers are accessed remotely.  
• Authentication is required when users access servers.  
• There is one vulnerability: user IDs and passwords travel across the network in 
clear text. 
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The consultants failed to develop a picture of the risk facing the enterprise. Consequently, 
senior managers believed that the financial information was secure, based on the results 
of the assessment. They felt safe from the threat of outsiders breaking into their network 
and stealing sensitive financial information. They were not considering other potential 
threats.  
Consider a second evaluation, which is performed by following the OCTAVE 
framework. Personnel from senior management, middle management, and staff levels 
participated in the risk evaluation. Phase 1 of OCTAVE was performed to identify assets, 
threats, and security requirements.  
One of the most critical assets identified was the sensitive financial information. If this 
information were made public, the reputation of the enterprise would suffer and could 
result in millions of dollars of lost business. In addition, anyone knowing this information 
could use it to profit illegally by trading stocks. The relative impact of losing the 
confidentiality of this information was high. Thus, one of the security requirements for 
the financial information was that it must be confidential.  
OCTAVE requires participants to consider a variety of potential threats. (The term 
"threats" indicates what or whom the assets are being protected from.) Several threats had 
motivation to possess this information, because the information could be used for 
financial gain. Furthermore, it was determined that the threats could be insiders or 
outsiders. One possible means for threats to gain access to the information was via the 
network, and all employees had access to the network. Technically savvy employees 
might be able to exploit any vulnerability that might be present.  
In addition, the information supplied by staff-level employees indicated that there was 
some dissatisfaction among some of the technical employees in the company. Thus, 
disgruntled insiders might have both the motive and the means to steal the information.  
Next, Phase 2 of OCTAVE was performed to identify infrastructure vulnerabilities. First, 
the important infrastructure components were identified through an examination of the 
layout of the physical and IT infrastructures. Because sensitive financial information was 
an important information asset, the server that contained the database with that 
information was identified as a high-priority component. A vulnerability evaluation for 
the server was performed.  
The vulnerability evaluation indicated the following:  
• The number of accounts on the server holding the sensitive information is limited.  
• The server is accessed remotely.  
• Authentication is required when a user accesses the server.  
• There was one major vulnerability: user IDs and passwords travel across the 
network in clear text. 
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Phase 3 of OCTAVE calls for an analysis of the asset, threat, and vulnerability 
information identified during Phases 1 and 2, in the context of intrusion scenarios to 
identify the organization’s risks. For example, the following intrusion scenario can be 
built using the information in this example:  
A technically savvy, disgruntled insider uses a network sniffer to steal 
passwords to the server containing the sensitive database. As soon as a 
password is known, the insider can access the sensitive information and 
use it for personal gain or make it public.  
The likelihood of such an attack was judged to be moderate to high. The 
impact would be high in terms of damage to the company’s reputation. 
This was judged to be a big risk to the enterprise. 
The senior managers understood the nature of this risk. They understood that it was 
possible for a sufficiently motivated insider to steal sensitive financial information and 
use it for profit. This was only one of many such risks to be identified using OCTAVE. 
The enterprise staff was now ready to start developing a strategy to protect the sensitive 
financial information as well as other important assets.  
By performing a comprehensive risk assessment that considers asset, threat, and 
vulnerability information and puts it into the context of the enterprise, the risks facing the 
enterprise can be identified. In addition, personnel from all levels can understand risks 
when they are put into the context of the enterprise, and can make sensible decisions 
concerning a protection strategy.    
   
1.4 Report Overview  
In the rest of this report, OCTAVE will be outlined in detail. We will describe each of the 
three phases of OCTAVE and the multiple processes within each phase. For each 
OCTAVE process, we include the following:  
• process activities—a high-level description of what happens at each step of the 
process. Included with the description of each activity is a description of the 
inputs and outputs of each process.  
• process diagram—a data-flow diagram showing the inputs and outputs of the 
process 
Following the phase and process descriptions are higher-level views of OCTAVE. 
Section 5 concisely summarizes OCTAVE goals and processes. The appendix provides a 
flowchart of the OCTAVE method.  
   
   
1 Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation and OCTAVE are service marks of 
Carnegie Mellon University.  
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Related resources 
 
The INFOSeMM framework working document (in EXCEL). 
 
IT Security Maturity Model assessment document (in EXCEL). 
 
Presentation on INFOSeMM (in Powerpoint)
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